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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Growing popularity of leasing as a funding mean for assets has forced standard setters to 
improve lease regulation. The average use of operating leases has increased 745% as a 
proportion of total debt from 1980 to 2007, while the use of capital leases has fell by half. 
(Cornaggia et al., 2013) Currently, operating leases are hiding off the balance sheet and it is 
not favourable for outside parties interested in the true financial position of the company.  
A new IFRS 16 standard on leases is pending to become effective and mandated in 2019, 
and it will force companies to recognize all leases on their balance sheet, having numerous 
implications from debt covenants to performance metrics. It requires companies to capitalize 
operating leases and show them on the balance sheet together with financial leases 
(Cornaggia et al. 2012). 
A method for capitalizing operating leases was developed by Imhoff et al. (1991), and it 
presents a method for calculating the amounts of unrecorded operating lease assets and debt 
as if they were recorded on the balance sheet. The model has been used since to study the 
effects of capitalizing off-balance sheet leases and capitalization is found to affect firms' 
income and balance sheet items as well as performance ratios. 
Another important subject area of this study is audit fees, as the purpose of this study is to 
examine the effect of capitalizing operating leases to audit fees. To better understand audit 
fees, auditing and the pricing of it needs to be addressed. Auditing provides independent 
assurance of the credibility of accounting information, therefore it serves financial statement 
users in valuing companies and per se increases the value of financial statement information. 
Increased value of financial statement information improves resource allocation in the 
markets as well as contracting efficiency (DeFond & Zhang, 2014), and auditing is required 
by law for operability and efficiency of markets. Auditors charge audit fees in exchange of 
auditing and there are different aspects affecting on how auditor’s charge. 
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Earliest significant audit fee research was done by Simunic (1980), who suggested that audit 
fees are a function of firm-specific factors that increase auditor's risk and of work required 
to complete the audit. There is a wide variety of preceding literature about audit fee 
attributes, and some attributes such as auditee size, risk and complexity are commonly agreed 
significant audit fee attributes among audit fee studies. Size of the auditee is the most 
significant and unanimously recognized explanatory variable of audit fees, as other variables 
have mixed results. (Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006) 
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION 
The field of operating leases is changing which makes studying the effects of capitalization 
a timely subject. The new IFRS 16 standard on leases brings on important questions 
regarding companies' financing strategies, and even though the possible material effects of 
IFRS 16 are yet to be seen, it is interesting to try to predict them. When operating leases are 
to be brought to the balance sheet in a similar way than financial leases, management faces 
big decisions and possible changes as companies’ might want to alter their financing 
structure to achieve the most favourable capital-debt structure.  
Auditors are among the first ones to examine the possible changes of the IFRS 16 through 
audits. As audit pricing is based on different auditor and client related determinants, it is 
interesting to see if capitalization of client's operating leases has an effect on audit fees. The 
results could help predict the audit pricing market's reaction to the new standard.  
The main objective of this study is to examine whether off-balance sheet operating leases 
are relevant to auditors and have an effect on audit fees. OLS regression analysis is used 
together with other analysis methods to study the effects of operating leases. Secondary 
object is to contribute to the audit fee research by presenting an overview of the most 
important audit fee determinants and presenting a new possible audit fee determinant, as well 
as contribute to the field of operating leases by giving an extensive review of operating leases 
and their capitalization. 
The capitalization method used in this study is developed by Imhoff et al. (1991) and since 
it has been used in many studies, but there does not exist studies on the effects of lease 
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capitalization to audit fees. The literature on audit fees is mostly focused on the effects of 
financial statement items or economic events to audit fees. Overall the effects of off-balance 
sheet items are generally less studied, which motivates to study the field. Also, as lately off-
balance sheet accounting has faced some criticism and a new standard to recognize all leases 
is to become mandated, the effects of operating leases are currently a very timely and 
interesting topic. Today, operating leases are an important source of funding for many 
companies, like their immense growth suggests, which makes changes in legislation 
particularly interesting as they affect so many companies and their debt-to-asset ratios and 
companies are likely to invent new ways to avoid capitalizing all leases.  
It is natural to analyse the effects of operating leases to audit fees, as audit fees are constantly 
changing and all kind of economical and legislative changes and situations reflect on them 
through companies. There is no simple method of audit pricing, and there are many different 
attributes known to affect audit fees and this makes it tempting to try to find some additional 
forces and attributes that affect audit fees. This study brings in a new attribute that could 
affect audit fees. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The study is a quantitative analysis that uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis 
to test the research hypotheses. The dependent variable of the model is audit fees and 
independent variables include some control variables as well as the main research variables 
examining the effect of capitalized operating leases to audit fees. I transferred all the 
continuous variables to logarithm in order to reduce skewedness and help in interpreting the 
results.  
The variables for capitalized operating leases were logCAP_LIAB and logCAP_A, of which 
the former was eliminated in the process as together they correlated too much and therefore 
misled the results. The research variable logCAP_A measures capitalized operating lease 
assets, which are calculated from the capitalized liabilities by the chosen capitalization 
method (Imhoff et al., 1991).  
   
4 
Other variables are chosen according to audit fee literature and the chosen control variables 
are found to affect audit fees by studies. These variables include total assets transformed to 
logarithm, indebtness measured by liabilities divided by assets, and three dummy variables; 
BIG4, having the value one if the auditor is one of Big 4 firms; LOSS, having the value one 
if the firm has experiences a loss in the previous fiscal period and BusyPeriod, having the 
value one if the fiscal period ends in December. The regression model also includes year 
dummies for all of the years 2000-2016, to control for the effects of yearly changes. 
The data in our research was obtained from Wharton Research Data Services databases. 
Audit fee data was from Audit Analytics database and all other data was obtained from 
Compustat database. Our total sample consisted of 731373 observations from North 
America, of firms between the years 2000 and 2016. Observations that did not contain all of 
the data values were omitted. Observations were from different industry firms, excluding 
financing firms with SIC codes 6000-6999, because they normally do not have operating 
leases. Data from Audit Analytics and Compustat databases was merged using SAS program 
in order to match company specific data to audit fee data. Companies’ standard industrial 
classification (SIC) codes were used as the linking data in both data groups.  
1.4 STRUCTURE 
After the introduction the study continues with a chapter about operating leases. The 
accounting of operating leases is presented and a legal framework for using operating leases 
in the U.S. and Europe is given. Then begins the literature review, starting with prior studies 
on operating leases and capitalization. The capitalization method used in this study is 
presented in this chapter. The next chapter is a literature review on audit fees, focusing on 
prior studies of audit pricing and audit fee determinants. After the literature reviews the study 
continues to the hypothesis development. Then the research model and variable construction 
is explained, followed by a presentation and discussion of the results. In the final paragraph, 
a conclusion is presented together with limitations and possible future research topics. 
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2 ACCOUNTING ON OPERATING LEASES 
2.1 BACKGROUND OF OPERATING LEASE ACCOUNTING 
A lease is a contract in which the owner of an asset – the lessor – conveys to another party – 
the lessee – the right to use that asset in exchange for a usually monthly lease payment. The 
legal right to that asset remains with the lessor. When a lease contract is signed and 
obligations of both parties are determined, it is still unperformed, and therefore accounting 
of leases is not so clear. (Revsine et al. 2017)  
There are different kind of leases. Financial leases are typical leases for acquiring property, 
plant and equipment and their accounting is equivalent to purchasing an asset. Operating 
leases are usually used to acquire assets for a shorter period of time and their accounting 
differs from asset purchases as they are simply rental agreements between parties. For 
operating leases, lessee simply uses an asset, typically equipment or property, until he gives 
it away. The title to the asset does not transfer to the lessee during or after the lease period, 
unlike in financial leases where the lessee has control over the asset as risks and rewards 
pass to the lessee. These two leasing methods contain different benefits and disadvantages 
that are discussed below. (Revsine et al. 2017) 
There are different reasons for using operating leases, one evident being working in an 
industry of big equipment such as aircraft that profits from leasing part of its equipment. 
Leasing is a financially good way to fund business. For financially distressed firms that may 
be unable to raise debt or equity capital to purchase equipment, leasing is a way to get it, and 
at the same time it does not affect the financial position as no debt is recorded to the balance 
sheet. (Cornaggia et al, 2012; Eisfeldt & Rampini, 2009; Rampini & Viswanathan, 2013 )  
The accounting of operating leases gives companies also other benefits apart from the non-
affected debt amount. If a company needs an assets for a short time, there is an obvious 
practical benefit in taking an operating lease. Also, as leased equipment are off-balance 
sheet, they do not affect ratios containing debt or asset elements, and therefore do not affect 
company’s apparent profitability. Operating leases also improve turnover ratios as their 
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assets contribute to the normal production process and enable better sales without increased 
debt or assets.  
Lease accounting has been a controversial subject for long. Leases are an important way to 
finance businesses, and the rapidly expanded use of operating leases has given incentives for 
regulators around the world to improve and change the regulation of leases in cooperation. 
The following table 1 (FASB/IASB meeting memo, 2007) gives a background for the current 
lease regulation situation. 
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Table 1: Lease regulation through history 
Year Author Doc Title 
1949 AICPA ARB 38 Disclosure of Long-Term Leases in Financial Statements of Lessees 
1962 AICPA ARS 4 Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements 
1964 APB APB Opinion 5 Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessees 
1966 APB APB Opinion 7 Accounting for Leases in Financial Statements of Lessors 
1972 APB APB Opinion 27 Accounting for Lease Transactions by Manufacturer or Dealer Lessors  
1973 SEC ASR 132 Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lessees  
1973 SEC ASR 141 Interpretations and Minor Amendments Applicable to Certain Revisions of Regulation S-X 
1973 APB APB Opinion 31 Disclosure of Lease Commitments by Lessees 
1973 SEC ASR 147 Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Regulation S-X Requiring Improved Disclosure of Leases  
1974 FASB DM An Analysis of Issues Related to Accounting for Leases 
1975 FASB ED Accounting for Leases 
1976 FASB ED (Revised) Accounting for Leases 
1976 FASB FAS 13 Accounting for Leases 
1980 IASC ED (E19) Accounting for Leases 
1982 IASC IAS 17 Accounting for Leases 
1997 IASC ED (E56) Leases 
1997 IASC IAS 17 (Revised) Leases 
2003 IASB IAS 17 (Revised) Leases 
1996 G4+1 Special Report Accounting for Leases: A New Approach  
1999 G4+1 Special Report Leases: Implementation of a New Approach  
 
 Accounting on operating leases  
8 
Table 1 presents the history of lease regulation. From 1949, long-term leases have been 
regulated. The earliest regulation on leases, ARB 38, required that material long-term leases 
be disclosed in the financial statement or notes. More concern was on disclosing the 
liabilities, as omitted liabilities were seen to affect judgments of financial statements more.  
Over ten years later, new regulation ARS 4 was issued as the importance of leases had grown 
and disclosure adjustments needed to be made for the financial statements to be more 
relevant and informative. The authors of ARS 4 argued that there are also right-to-use assets 
where the lessor does not have ownership of the asset, and that in all cases all leases should 
be recognized on the balance sheet at the discounted present value of cash flows.  
(FASB/IASB, 2007) 
Two years later, APB Opinion 5 on reporting of leases was issued, as it was noted that 
previous requirements had not reached wanted results. No consistent pattern of lease 
disclosure nor enough capitalizations of leased property had emerged from the previous 
obligations. Opinion 5 differentiated form ARS 4 in the definition of an asset as it stated that 
property rights conveyed by a lease do not meet the definition of an asset themselves, but 
the lessee must also create equity by the lease arrangement for it to be considered as an asset. 
In the following years, two other APB Opinions on lease accounting were issued. They 
described how lessors are to account and present leases on their financial statement. 
(FASB/IASB, 2007) 
In 1973, in total four regulatory documents were issued. The focus was on lessees' 
accounting and reporting of leases. Three of the documents were issued by SEC and the first 
two did not present any new models for lease accounting but specified how lessees are to 
record leases according to the current regulation. After two SEC’s releases, APB issued an 
Opinion that required less disclosure for leases than SEC had previously identified to be 
needed. SEC's last publication that same year was provoked by APB’s release and as a 
response to the light disclosure requirements it presented the most extensive recognition and 
disclosure requirements to date and criticized the previous excessively light requirements.  
In 1974, Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Discussion Memorandum discussed 
new lease accounting models and provided a list of criteria for capitalizing leases. During 
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the following years, FASB Memorandum was followed by two FASB Exposure Drafts in 
1975 and 1976 on the accounting of leases. The Drafts provided models for lease accounting 
and updated the criteria for lease capitalization.  Later the same year, FASB issued the 
standard FAS 13; Accounting for leases, based on the exposure draft. FAS 13 is presented 
in more details in the next chapter.  
In 1980, International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) followed FASB by issuing 
its own Exposure Draft on lease accounting, which was very similar to the FAS 13. Two 
years later the Exposure Draft led to issuance of IAS 17; Leases, which was based on the 
same requirements as FAS 13. Since then, both standards have been revised a few times and 
today they have some important differences between them, which are presented below in 
table 2, after presenting both standards in detail.  (FASB/IASB, 2007) 
In addition to the leasing standards, in 1996 and 1999, a special report was published by 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States (named the 
G4+1), together with IASC, with the objective to develop common rules for leasing and to 
unify lease accounting. The amount of leasing had reached the volume of $140 billion 
worldwide and the group G4+1 proposed new elements for lease accounting and disclosure 
to be considered in order to increase the comparability and usefulness of financial statements.  
The new lease accounting elements were focused on fair value accounting of rights and 
obligations conveyed by a lease, recorded as the present value of the minimum payments 
required by the lease plus any other liabilities incurred. Lessors should report financial assets 
representing amounts receivable from the lessee and residual interests as separate assets. The 
amounts reported as financial assets by lessors would, in general, be the converse of the 
amounts reported as liabilities by lessees. (FASB/IASB, 2007) 
2.2 FAS 13 
The Financial Accounting Standards board (FASB) is responsible for U.S. Corporations' 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). FASB regulates lease accounting by 
FAS 13, Accounting for leases. The most recent revision of FAS 13 became effective in 
February 2016, and today the standard is also known as Accounting Standards Codification 
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(ASC) Topic 842. As IFRS issued the new lease accounting standard IFRS 16 in January 
2016, there was also need for FASB to update the lease accounting policies. 
FAS 13 became effective in 1976. FAS 13/Topic 842 lets organizations classify their leases 
as financial lease – called capital lease in the U.S. and in FAS 13 – or operating lease. 
According to FAS 13, if even one of the below requirements is met at the inception of lease, 
then the lease has to be classified as a financial lease and capitalized on the balance sheet: 
(FASB, 1976) 
 the lessor transfers ownership of the asset to the lessee by the end of the lease term 
 the lease contains a bargain purchase option to the lessee 
 the lease term is equal or exceeds 75% of the asset’s estimated economic life 
 the present value of the minimum lease payments at the inception equals or exceeds 
90% of the asset’s market value 
If none of the requirements are met, then a lease may be considered an operating lease and 
treated as such. If parties to a lease contract decide to change the provisions of the lease 
during the leasing period, so that it affects the classification, then the modified contract is 
considered a new contract. If the lease term is under 12 months, the lease may be considered 
as neither of the above and it can be presented as rentals that do not need to be disclosed in 
the footnotes. (FASB, 1976)  
If a lease is a financial lease, the lessee recognizes it as a depreciable asset on its balance 
sheet and an obligation, debt on the balance sheet, equal to the present value amount of the 
future minimum lease payments or the fair value if it is lower, excluding other related costs 
to be paid by the lessor. On the income statement, lease payments are divided into interest 
expense and obligation payments. Leases are disclosed in lessee's financial statement with 
specified information on future minimum payments, gross amount of assets, subleases and 
contingent rentals. Lessor recognizes an asset on its balance sheet and lease receivables for 
the present value of the rents, and discloses all the essential information on its financial 
statement. (FASB, 1976) 
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Operating leases are not recognized by the lessee on its balance sheet, the lessee only records 
monthly payments as rent or operating expenses on the income statement and therefore the 
asset does not affect lessee’s assets or liabilities. Rental expense is recognized on a straight-
line basis, unless another basis is more representative. Lessee will disclose in its financial 
statement or footnotes the future minimum rental payments required, total amount of 
minimum rentals to be received, rental expenses, contingent rentals and sublease rentals, and 
a general description of the lessee's leasing arrangements. Lessor recognizes the asset on its 
balance sheet and records straight-line depreciation expenses normally, as well as records 
receivables from the lease as rent revenue. (FASB, 1976) 
2.3 IAS 17 
In Europe, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is responsible for setting 
regulation for European corporations. IASB regulates lease accounting by IAS 17, Leases, 
which became effective in 1997 and was revised in 2010. 
According to IAS 17, a lease is classified as a financial lease if it transfers all of the risks 
and rewards incidental to ownership of an asset. All other leases are operating leases. IAS 
17 includes restrictions about applicable lease types, and it is not applied to: (IASB, 1997) 
 leases to explore for or use minerals, oil, natural gas or other similar resources 
 licensing agreements for films, video recordings, plays, manuscripts, patents and 
copyrights 
 property held by lessee and accounted as investment property 
 investment property provided by the lessor under operating leases 
 biological assets held or provided by the lessee under financial or operating leases 
Classification is done at the inception of the lease and if parties to a lease contract are to 
change the provisions of the lease so that it would affect the classification, the revised 
agreement is considered as a new agreement. If a lease includes both land and buildings, 
each element is to be assessed and classified separately, but not if lessee wants to classify 
both as investment property and financial lease at the fair value, which is allowed under IAS 
40.  
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In addition to the formal classification requirement, IAS 17.10 provides examples of 
situations where a lease would normally be classified as a financial lease: (IASB, 1997) 
 the lease transfers ownership of the asset to the lessee by the end of the lease term 
 the lessee has the option to purchase the asset at a bargaining price that is expected 
to be sufficiently lower than the fair value at the day of the option becoming 
exercisable, and it is reasonably certain 
 the lease term is for the major part of the economic life of the asset even if it is not 
transferred 
 the present value of the lease payment at the inception amounts to the fair value of 
the leased asset, at least substantially 
 the leased assets are of specialized nature so that only the lessee can use them without 
major modifications 
At the inception, lessee's recognition of financial lease as assets and liabilities is at the fair 
value or present value of minimum lease payments. If present value of lease payments is 
lower, then it is applied. Discount rate used in the present value calculation is the interest 
rate of the lease, or the lessee's borrowing rare if the former is not determinable. Any 
additional direct costs related to the lease are added to the amount of the asset.  
If the lease would not be recognized as an asset and a liability, it would distort financial 
ratios and underestimate economic resources. Financial lease is disclosed under IFRS 7's 
requirements concerning financial instruments, but also further disclosures can be made. 
Lessors recognize assets as financial lease in the balance sheet and receivable at the income 
statement at an amount equal to the net investment in the lease.  (IASB, 1997) 
For operating leases, lessee usually recognizes the lease as an expense on a straight-line basis 
over the lease term. In addition to meeting the requirements of IFRS 7, lessees can make the 
following disclosures for the reporting period: (IASB, 1997) 
 the total of future minimum lease payments under non-cancellable operating leases, 
for not later than one year,  not later than five years and later than five years 
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 the total of future minimum sublease payments expected to be received under non-
cancellable subleases 
 lease and sublease payments recognized as an expense, with separation to minimum 
lease payments, contingent rents and sublease payments 
 a general description of the lessee's significant leasing arrangements  
Lessors recognize assets in the balance sheet according to the nature of the asset and the 
leasing income is recognized as income on a straight-line basis, if no other basis is more 
representative, on the income statement. Direct costs related to negotiations or arrangements 
will be added to the carrying amount of the leased asset and recognized as expenses over the 
lease term on the same basis as the lease income. Depreciation of an asset will be consistent 
with lessor's normal depreciation policy. In addition to IFRS 7, lessors can also disclose 
following information:  (IASB, 1997) 
 the future minimum lease payments under non-cancellable operating lease, for not 
later than one year,  not later than five years and later than five years 
 total contingent rents recognized as income in the period 
 a general description of the lessor's leasing arrangements  
2.4 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FAS 13 AND IAS 17 
FAS 13 and IAS 17 have some important differences, despite both regulating leases. FAS 
13 regulates lease accounting in the U.S. and IAS 17 mainly regulates countries of the 
European Union. The main differences from the point of view are presented below: (FASB, 
1976; IASB, 1997) 
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Table 2: Most significant differences between IAS 17 and FAS 13 
Attribute IAS 17 FAS 13 
Naming of a lease that transfers 
risks and rewards to the lessee 
Financial lease Capital lease 
Scope of standard Applies to all kind of assets, also 
intangible 
Only applies to property, plant 
and equipment 
Classification of lease  Depends on the substance of the 
lease 
Depends on criteria, lease is 
capital lease if meets criteria, 
otherwise operating lease 
Leases of land and buildings Leases of land and buildings are 
assessed and classified 
separately 
Leases of land and buildings are 
usually accounted as a single 
unit 
Borrowing rate for calculating 
minimum future payments 
Implicit interest rate of the lease 
used to calculate minimum 
payments, unless it is not 
practicable to determine, then 
incremental borrowing rate 
Incremental borrowing rate of 
the lessee used to calculate 
minimum payments, unless 
implicit rate is known and lower 
Depreciation Operating lease depreciated over 
the lease term or the useful life of 
the lease, depending on which 
one is shorter 
Operating lease depreciated 
over the lease term 
Future rent disclosures Three groups for future rent 
disclosures; first year, years two 
to five, and years beyond five 
Every year for the first five 
years, then the remaining total 
amount 
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2.6 THE NEW LEASING STANDARD – IFRS 16 
On January 2016, a new regulation for leases was issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), after many years of development. Around the same time, FASB 
also issued new, improved lease accounting standard, Topic 842. These new standards were 
developed in cooperation, and both become mandated on January 2019. First the IFRS 16 is 
presented. 
IFRS 16 specifies how leases are to be recognized, measured, presented and disclosed under 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The new standard has many similarities 
to the previous IAS 17, and it is viewed as an improved version of IAS 17, which aims to 
improve the treatment of leases in financial statements as well as increase transparency of 
financial statements.  
IFRS 16's single lease accounting model completely changes the accounting of leases for the 
lessee, since it requires the lessee to recognize all leases over 12 months as assets on its 
balance sheet, unless they are of low value. Over 85% of leases are estimated to be operating 
leases (IFRS publication, 2016) so IFRS 16 will have significant effects on companies' 
balance sheets.  
In IFRS 16, at the inception of a lease, the lessee will recognize a right-of-use asset and a 
lease liability. The right-of-use asset is measured at a cost model, at the amount of the lease 
liability plus any initial direct costs incurred by the lessee and less any accumulated 
depreciation costs or impairment. The leased liability is measured at the present value of the 
lease payments, discounted at the implicit rate or if it is not determinable then at the 
incremental borrowing rate, as in IAS 17. Lessor's treatment of leases is not affected as the 
lessor already classifies leases as financial or operational under IAS 17.  
IFRS 16 applies to almost all leases, with some mentionable exceptions: leases to explore 
for or use minerals, oil, natural gas or other similar resources, biological assets and licenses 
of intellectual property. A contract is a lease if it conveys the right to control the use of an 
identified asset for a period of time in exchange for consideration. Control is conveyed when 
the lessee has the right to direct the asset's use and obtain substantially all the economic 
benefits from its use. (IASB, 2016) If a lease contains also non-lease components, the lessee 
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will allocate separately the consideration payable on the basis of estimated stand-alone 
prices, or allocate all components of the lease together. Lessors will allocate consideration 
in accordance with IFRS 15; Revenue from Contracts with Customers. (IASB, 2016) 
IAS 17 let companies treat financial and operating leases differently, but as IFRS 16 requires 
all leases to be recognized, companies can no longer benefit from hiding operating leases in 
their footnotes. As over 85% of leases are operating leases, off-balance sheet, investors have 
had difficulties estimating profitability of firms, and the new IFRS 16 is mainly developed 
for the needs of investors. Capitalization of operating leases increases comparability between 
financial statements of firms leasing and firms buying assets, which facilitates investor 
decisions. IFRS 16 will reduce investors' needs to make adjustments by providing a richer 
set of information and increasing relevancy of financial statements. (IASB, 2016) Also, IFRS 
16 simplifies lease accounting as all leases are recognized in a similar way. (IASB, 2016) 
IFRS 16 will affect financial statement items and ratios. IFRS 16 affects some sectors more 
than others, airline, retail and traveling industries for example are known to use off-balance 
sheet leases extensively and therefore the new standard will significantly affect these 
industries. (IFRS publication, 2016) Assets and liabilities on financial statement will 
increase for firms based on how much operating leases they had, and this affects asset 
turnover ratios and debt-to-equity ratios. Increase of debt can affect covenants so companies 
must be careful not to breach covenant terms. When IFRS 16 is applied, companies are 
expected to evaluate the lease terms and definitions more rigorously which can lead to 
recognition of different amounts of lease liabilities than today's operating lease commitments 
suggest. (IASB, 2010) 
IASB (2017) recently published an update on the implementation of IFRS 16. It evaluates 
how companies are doing with the required changes and discusses the transition options and 
benefits. According to the publication, the transition comes with available cost savings to 
companies that carefully choose the right options in implementing the new standard. The 
IASB publication mentions some examples of possible cost savings; taking the least costly 
options will lead to approximations in the companies' financial statements which will affect 
reported amounts possibly for several years; for long-term leases of large assets companies 
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may prefer to include extra costs gathering historical data to avoid a higher depreciation 
charges in the income statement; and companies may measure right-of-use assets on the date 
of initial application of IFRS 16 without using historical data, which may lead to higher 
amounts than when using historical data. It is therefore crucial that companies think about 
their transition choices as early as possible, as it enables them to get the most benefits as in 
cost savings and reporting quality. (IASB, 2017) 
The effects of capitalizing operating leases have been discussed and some companies have 
been frightened by the possible negative effects (see table 3), but financial statements users 
are confident there are no surprises in applying the new IFRS 16. It is not expected to give 
rise to changes in credit ratings or in cost of finance, since credit-rating agencies and lenders 
have already estimated the effects of off-balance sheet leases on financial leverage and for 
them nothing is expected to change when IFRS 16 is applied. Nevertheless, a survey done at 
an IFRS Foundation conference declares that only 45% of companies surveyed at said they 
will have the same amount of leases when they apply IFRS 16 in 2019. (IASB, 2010)  
The table 3 below further illustrates the changes in leasing policies IAS 17 and IFRS 16, as 
well as explains the reasons for changes and shows their implications at firms' perspective. 
(IASB, 1997; IASB, 2016; IASB, 2016, Investor perspective)
 Accounting on operating leases  
18 
 
Table 3: IFRS 16 effects and differences to IAS 17 summarized  
Attribute IAS 17 IFRS 16  Why Impact 
Classification of leases Leases classified as financial or 
operating. 
All leases to be treated as financial 
leases. 
To increase transparency and 
comparability. 
Increased transparency and 
comparability between different 
firms' financial statements. 
Accounting treatment Treatment of operating leases is less 
complex than of financial leases and 
their volume is greater. 
All leases treated the same. Accountants have not had 
challenges with operating leases as 
they are off-balance sheet. 
More work, time spent and 
interaction with other departments 
for accountants. 
Measuring and 
interest rate 
Financial lease assets and liabilities 
measured at fair value or at the 
minimum lease payments if they are 
lower.  Implicit rate used in 
calculations if known, otherwise 
lessee's borrowing rate. Any direct 
costs are added to asset’s value. 
Liabilities measured at the present 
value of future lease payments. 
Implicit rate used if known, 
otherwise incremental borrowing 
rate. No mention of fair value or 
minimum lease payments. 
New standard aims to provide a 
consistent view of lease obligations 
and to achieve this measurements 
need to be specifically defined to 
ensure a consistent measurement 
approach. 
Measurement of operating lease 
assets and liabilities previously not 
done. Requires work and extensive 
data collection to capture all 
relevant information for the 
measurement. 
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Nature of expenses Straight-line operating lease 
expenses recognized. 
Depreciation charge for the leased 
asset recorded as well as an interest 
expense for the lease liability. 
Operating leases treated same way 
as financial leases and as they are 
recorded they have to be 
depreciated and grow interest. 
Assets and liabilities increase, key 
financial ratios change. Operating 
costs decrease and  financing costs 
increase. 
Exemptions No exemptions regarding the 
amount or length of a lease. 
Short-term leases of less than 12 
months or low value leases 
exempted. 
The new standard applies for all 
leases, only leases that are not 
material are exempted from 
disclosure. 
Workload of accountants eased a 
little as small leases not disclosed. 
Disclosure Financial leases disclosed in the 
balance sheet, operating leases in 
the footnotes. 
All kind of leases disclosed in the 
balance sheet. Additional 
disclosures for leases with complex 
features. 
Leases are treated and disclosed 
equally, therefore disclosure 
requirements redefined. 
Accountants have to be careful to 
capture data in such a way that it 
enables the fulfillment of the 
disclosure requirements. 
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3 PRIOR STUDIES ON OPERATING LEASES 
This chapter marks the beginning of the literature review. First, in this chapter operating 
leases, their capitalization and its effects are discussed. Secondly, in the following chapter a 
theory of audit fee pricing is presented and audit fee determinants are discussed. Finally, the 
literature review is concluded with a paragraph about the effects of operating leases to audit 
fees, which leads us towards the hypothesis development. 
3.1 CURRENT USE OF OPERATING LEASES 
According to Fülbier et al. (2008) the separation of leases into operating and financial leases 
can result in incentives to favor operating leases to avoid on-balance-sheet debt. Operating 
leases are in favor of management as they make companies look more profitable and the 
current asset base more productive by excluding leased assets and related obligations from 
balance sheets. Leasing is a good alternative to buying an asset and financially distressed 
firms can lease without increasing debt amounts. By using operating leases managers are 
able to manage debt covenants.  
Beatty et al. (2010) examined accounting quality and its effects on leasing. They found that 
firms with low quality accounting are more likely to lease assets than purchase them as they 
have limited access to capital investments due to liquidity constraints. Therefore poor 
accounting quality firms do not necessarily have lower total investments, they just lease 
instead of buying. Leasing services actually serve as a substitute mechanism for reducing 
financing constraints. Accounting information is less important in lease decisions when 
lessor's incentives to conduct due diligence are higher and in the existence of capital 
expenditure covenants, since bank's private information and monitoring can serve as 
substitute for accounting information and substitute the role of accounting quality. (Beatty, 
Liao & Weber, 2010)  
Cornaggia et al. (2012) stated that contrary to assumptions, firms’ decisions to choose 
operating leases as a form of financing do not depend on economic determinants and 
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traditional lease versus buy -decisions. They also tested whether firms use off-balance-sheet 
leases to strengthen their balance sheets, and found that firms’ and industries that are not 
expected to get traditional economic benefits of leasing are increasingly using operating 
leases to benefit from hidden and manageable debt covenants.  
Nurvani et al., (2015) found that economic determinants do not explain the increasing use of 
operating leases, but activities are mostly explained by the value of owned fixed assets, 
growth level and firm size. They supported the view of Cornaggia et al. (2012) that if 
operating leases cannot be explained with these determinants, then the management is most 
likely taking advantage of the hiding effects of off-balance-sheet leases to hide the amount 
of debt. 
Therefore Cornaggia et al. (2012) provided support for the proposed changes by IASB and 
FASB, as the current operating lease accounting treatment affects corporate decision 
making. They also found that the use of operating leases has increased a lot during the recent 
years and the trend seems to concern all industries, which also gives incentives for new 
regulation.  
There is evidence from around the time of the adoption of FAS 13 that companies 
restructured the terms of most capital leases to avoid the new capitalization requirements and 
recognition of long-term leases. (Imhoff & Thomas, 1988) Capital leases were substituted 
with operating leases and non-lease sources of financing in order to avoid capitalizing them. 
This kind of substitution is a very possible preadaptation consequence to the IFRS 16 that 
becomes mandated in 2019. 
Krishnan and Sengupta (2011) studied the auditor perception of recognized versus disclosed 
obligations related to operating leases and unfunded pension obligations. They evaluated the 
relation between two pairs of obligations (on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
obligations) and audit fees and going-concern opinions. According to them this would be an 
important issue of auditors systematically disregard off-balance sheet obligations relative to 
on-balance sheet obligations, as it could contribute to the risk of audit failure. They found 
operating leases to be significantly, positively associated with audit fees, whereas financial 
leases are not associated. For pensions obligations the results were different, as both on- and 
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off-balance sheet obligations were positively and significantly associated with audit fees. 
Additionally, operating leases were seen to be associated with going-concern opinions but 
pension obligations were not, which led to the conclusion that firms that use off-balance 
sheet operating leases face some additional costs from increased audit fees and increased 
going-concern opinion, especially firms with important amounts of operating leases. 
3.2 CAPITALIZATION OF OPERATING LEASES 
Constructive capitalization method was developed by Imhoff, Lipe and Wright in 1991 as 
an answer to the problems of operating leases. They found that numerous firms in different 
industries reported very large non-cancellable operating lease commitments and those firms 
were in effect using significantly more assets to create revenues than they reported on their 
balance sheets, and they had also much more leverage than their reported debt to equity ratio 
would suggest. Constructive capitalization method (Imhoff et al., 1991) allows to get the 
amounts of unrecorded assets and debt if they were recorded on the balance sheet from their 
inception, and it is therefore widely used in academic literature to see monetary effects of 
operating leases.  
Constructive capitalization affects assets, liabilities and net income. The capitalization 
method starts by estimating the amount of debt related to the lease. To estimate the debt that 
would be recorded if the lease was reported on the balance sheet from its inception, the 
schedule of minimum future cash flows for operating leases with remaining non-cancellable 
lease terms in excess of one year is determined. That amount is recorded for the next five 
years, following a single lump sum for all remaining payments after the fifth year. (Imhoff 
et al. 1991) 
The amount recorded for liability is the same amount that would have been recorded had the 
lease been accounted as a financial lease. The minimum future cash flows are then 
discounted using an estimate of the firm's borrowing rate and an estimate of the remaining 
life of the leased asset. The result is an estimate of the present value of the remaining 
operating lease, the amount to be recorded as liability. (Imhoff et al. 1991) 
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After the liability is measured, the unamortized off-balance sheet asset is estimated by 
examining the relation between assets and debt. To assess the amount of the asset, an 
estimate of the weighted average total life of the leased asset as well as an assumed method 
of depreciation are required. Most assets are depreciated using the straight-line depreciation 
method, so it is applicable, but the total life of the asset is harder to assume. According to 
Imhoff et al. (1991) assets are usually between 60 and 80 % of the unrecorded liability, and 
it is reasonbale to a rule-of-thumb of 70%. With these assumption it is possible to get the 
asset that would be reported on the balance sheet, but the assumptions used in the calculation 
increase valuation errors in calculation and therefore assets are harder to measure than the 
liabilities. 
The figure 1 below shows the relation between leased asset and liability during the life of 
the asset. The striped area represents the difference between the present value of the 
unrecorded debt and the present value of the unrecorded asset, and the difference is highest 
in the middle of the life cycle and zero at the inception and at the end. As is said, according 
to Imhoff et al. (1991) the asset percentage is usually between 60 and 80 % of the unrecorded 
liability. Present value of unrecorded assets decreases linearly, as the asset is in depreciated 
in straight-line, as assumed. At the start, no payments are made yet, then during the first 
years the debt payments consist of mainly from the interest expenses and towards the end 
the amount of the principal debt payments grow. When lease terminates, the present values 
of both unrecorded assets and liabilities is zero.  
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Figure 1: The relationship between the unrecorded operating lease liability and unrecorded operating lease asset 
 
Now the capitalization effects to income statement are presented in the figure 2. The striped 
area represents the cumulative excess of financial lease's expenses over operating lease's 
expenses. The figure illustrates how expenses of financial lease are high at the beginning of 
the lease term, as for operating leases expenses are even throughout the years. The point t2 
represents time when periodic expenses of both kind of leases are equal, and it also is the 
point where financial lease's difference between liabilities and assets is at its maximum. Prior 
to this point the overall depreciation plus interest expenses under the financial lease 
accounting method exceed the operating expense resulting from the operating lease, and after 
the point the monthly rent costs from operating lease become greater than the sum of 
depreciation and interest expenses. This point occurs past the half way of the lease's life.  
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Capitalization of operating leases on the balance sheet will only have a small total effect on 
the period's income if the average age of a company's lease contracts is around t2. According 
to Imhoff et al. (1991), for a company with a stable portfolio of leases this will be the case, 
since the average lease is 50% of the way through its life, and thus the effects of capitalization 
to income statement are minimal. (Imhoff et al., 1991) 
 
Figure 2: The relation between the total annual expense from the financial and operating leases 
 
3.3 CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS ON FINANCIAL RATIOS 
Companies have resisted the new IFRS 16 standard, as it forces them to disclose additional 
debt and affects their profitability ratios and debt covenants. The lease accounting changes 
will impact standard risk and performance metrics, which can be seen as being biased due to 
off-balance sheet items. 
In addition to the obvious balance sheet effects, capitalization affects income statements. 
Two common performance measures, return on assets and return on equity, used to predict, 
compare and evaluate a firm's economic performance change by adjustments to net assets 
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and earnings. The effects of capitalization on these measures are systematic and lead to 
increased profitability (ROE) and decreased asset turnover (ROA). Also price-to-book (P/B) 
ratio and price-earnings (P/E) ratio that are popular comparative market multiples used to 
evaluate a firm are affected by capitalization. (Imhoff, Lipe, Wright, 1997). 
Beattie et al. (1998) studied the impact of operating lease capitalization to accounting ratios 
and found that capitalization has a significant impact on profit margin, return on assets, asset 
turnover and gearing. The significant changes to key accounting ratios and shifts in company 
performance rankings suggests that capitalization affects interested parties’ decisions and 
company cash flows. (Beattie et al., 1998) The data in their study was from 1994 and in the 
random sample of firms on average 39% of long-term debt was off the balance sheet. Since 
1994, the average ratio of operating leases has grown and the results of capitalization have 
most likely become bigger.                                                                                                                                                                 
According to Ge (2006) firms with high operating lease activities have declines in future 
profit margins as well as in future asset turnover ratios compared to low operating lease 
firms. Also, firms with low amounts of operating lease are more likely to be in financial 
distress and let lease contracts explore without replacing them. Therefore capitalization 
would have a bigger impact on firms’ performance ratios depending on the amount of 
operating leases.  
Fülbier et al. (2008) studied the German markets for listed companies and the impact of lease 
capitalization on financial ratios. According to Fülbier et al. (2008) the capitalization of 
operating leases has an impact especially on financial ratios based on assets and liabilities, 
which may trigger management incentives to restrain these effects. Nevertheless, they stated 
that the effects of capitalization are only minor and should not be overstated, and that many 
industries remain unaffected. 
A study by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) suggests that more financially constrained firms 
benefit from the higher debt capacity of leased capital, and hence they will lease a larger 
fraction of their capital. When measuring the effects of financial constraints on investment 
cash flows, leased capital must be taken into account as otherwise results are likely 
overstated. Small firms tend to lease more, about half of their capital, and the higher debt 
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capacity of leasing is one important reason for that. (Eisfeldt & Rampini, 2009) This suggests 
that capitalization will affect firms that are financially constrained as they will have to make 
some changes when their current operating leases are capitalized. Also, capitalization will 
bring more transparency to financial statements as now the effects of financial constraints 
are likely overstated because of off-balance sheet debt. 
3.4 CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS ON COMPARABILITY AND RELEVANCY 
Imhoff et al. (1991) that first introduced the capitalization method for operating leases, stated 
that operating leases have a significant effect on risk and return measures, and thus 
constructive capitalization of long-term lease commitments enhances the relevancy and 
comparability of firm specific measures of risk and performance (Imhoff et al. 1991).  
Cornaggia et al. (2013) stated that the average use of operating leases has increased 745% 
as a proportion of total debt from 1980 to 2007, while the use of capital leases has fell by 
half. The use of operating leases varies as many firms that do not use that kind of financing, 
and this distortion in the common risk and performance metrics affects comparisons of firms. 
According to Cornaggia et al. (2012), market participants relying on financial statements 
should not exclusively rely on balance sheet and income statement information, at the 
expense of important information in footnotes. Operating leases do not only move debt and 
assets off the balance sheet, and affect return on capital and debt-to-capital ratios, they also 
lead to underestimated firm risk and overstated performance if firms rely much on off-
balance sheet items. (Cornaggia et al., 2012)  
Nuryani (2015) found that constructive capitalization of operating leases significantly affects 
company's financial ratios and is relevant information in economic decision making. 
Therefore when operating leases are not capitalized, the relevancy of financial ratios will 
render financial statements biased thus misleading users of financial statements, as relevant 
information for decision making is omitted. Therefore, in order to compare firms, operating 
leases should be taken into account by capitalizing them. Nuryani (2015) concludes that 
regulation should be extended to require for companies to disclose operating lease 
information. 
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Jennings and Marques (2013) have studied how different amortization methods affect firms’ 
comparability. Since capitalized operating leases have to be amortized or depreciated, this is 
a relevant study in this field. They studied the amortized costs of operating leases and 
compared straight-line amortization method to the present value amortization method. There 
had been arguments against the straight-line amortization of leases because the front-loading 
of expenses in this method does not reflect the economics of the lease asset and it makes 
within-industry comparability harder.  
Hence Jennings and Marques (2013) compared these two amortization methods and their 
effects to firms’ comparability within industries. They first argued that an accounting method 
that lowers the within-industry standard deviation can be said to enhance comparability, 
because that method results in similar companies appearing more similar. Then they 
compared these two amortization methods and their effects to comparability and found no 
significant difference between the methods. Their results showed no evidence in support of 
requiring straight-line amortization method for operating leases, and also did not show 
evidence in favour of present value amortization in response for the negative arguments to 
the straight-line amortization method. (Jennings & Marques, 2013) 
3.5 CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS ON STOCK AND INVESTOR’S RISK ASSESSMENT 
Beaver (1981) argued that it does not matter whether information is disclosed in the 
statement or in the footnotes, as stakeholders are wise enough to digest information from any 
sources and accurately reflect it to share prices. This is a rather contracting view to the more 
recent studies on information disclosure importance. 
Imhoff et al., (1993) studied the importance of information disclosure in financial statements 
versus in footnotes for different user groups, and whether a bigger shareholder risk is 
associated with footnote disclosure. They divided financial statement users into two user 
groups – shareholders and management compensation committees, and the results of their 
study suggested that off-balance leases are incorporated in shareholder risk assessment but 
not in executive compensation decisions. Executive compensation is mostly based on 
measures such as return on assets net income and operating income, and there was little 
correlation between compensation and accounting measures adjusted for operating leases. 
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To conclude, the study found that the information usefulness of disclosures vary between 
user groups. (Imhoff et al, 1993) 
Ge (2006) examined the effect of operating leases to earnings and stock prices, and found 
that investors seem to incorrectly assess the effects. Ge finds, that similar to on-balance-
sheet accruals and external financing, operating lease activities are negatively associated 
with future earnings and stock returns, but investors seem to value them as if they were 
positively associated with future operating performance. The stock market mispricing of 
operating lease information is likely part of under-valuating the information value in 
footnotes, even though information in the footnotes contains incremental explanatory power 
in predicting future earnings and stock returns beyond balance sheet items. So off-balance-
sheet operating leases have implications on future earnings and stock returns. Picconi (2004), 
suggested that firms might take advantage of investors' incomplete evaluating of pension 
information in the footnotes, and this supports Ge's finding of mispricing footnote 
information.  
Fülbier et al. (2008) studied the effects of lease capitalization on listed German companies 
and the results were slightly different from most similar studies. They stated that 
capitalization requirements may motivate management to modificate lease contracts, change 
investment and financing decisions, increase earnings management to smooth ratio changes, 
but the effects on profitability ratios or market multiples are minimal as operating leases do 
not mislead equity investors. 
A recent study by Dogan (2016) of operating lease effects to stock returns suggests that firms 
with more operating lease commitments earn a significant premium over firms with fewer 
commitments, and this premium is countercyclical. Firms that have higher levels of 
operating leases also have higher operating leverage, and consequently they are riskier and 
their cash flows are sensitive to business cycles. (Dogan, 2016) This implies that during a 
period of economic prosperity cash flows would be higher and that during recession the cash 
flows would be lower than for firms with lower levels of operating leases. 
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4 PRIOR STUDIES ON AUDIT FEES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO AUDITING AND AUDIT FEES 
Auditing provides independent assurance of the credibility of accounting information for 
third parties and therefore it is required by law. To have a good quality audit and a qualified 
audit opinion profits audited firms and therefore they are willing to pay for high quality 
audits. The growing complexity of business transactions and accounting standards increases 
auditing's potential to add value. (DeFond & Zhang, 2014)  
An audit consists of 1) assessment of the overall risk and 2) planning and execution of audit 
procedures, which both require professional judgment and knowledge. Auditors are indeed 
experts working in accordance with a wide set of standards, but auditing still requires 
decision-making and real actions that expose auditors to possible underperformance, over-
auditing or overcharging. These actions have implications for audit quality, efficiency and 
regulation. There does not exist a linear relationship with audit fees and audit quality. 
(Causholli, 2012).  
From 2001, publicly traded companies in the United States are required to disclose amount 
and nature of audit fees paid to external auditors. This regulation aims to increase and 
maintain audit independence and objectivity as well as increase companies' reporting quality. 
(Dickins & Higgs, 2005)  Also, in 2002 the European Commission recommended mandatory 
disclosure of audit fees and non-audit fees to enhance auditor independence and it led to 
revised regulation. (Griffin, 2006) Nevertheless, auditors are not required to disclose the 
attributes of their fees charged and many different circumstances and matters may affect 
audit fees, which is why they are interesting to study to find some pattern in audit pricing. 
Normally audit fees consists of costs and additional fee premiums. There exists many studies 
on audit fee determinants and the most relevant ones are cited in this literature review. This 
chapter starts with an audit pricing theory and continues with previous studies on audit fee 
attributes. 
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4.2 AUDIT PRICING THEORY 
For every audit commission the client pays the auditor an audit fee, for the auditor to go 
through the financial and non-financial documents and state whether they gives a fair and 
true view of the firm's financial performance or other concern. In this study the focus is on 
financial reporting and audit fees for auditing financial statements. Audits are conducted to 
provide third party assurance to stakeholders such as investors, because audits reduce the 
risks of material misstatements in financial statements and shareholders are then able to 
better evaluate risks and returns for their investments.  
Simunic (1980) presented a model for audit pricing. The model suggests that an audit fee is 
a positive function of the firm-specific factors that increase an auditor's risk and the amount 
of auditing work required. The model calculates the minimum fee for different levels of audit 
quantity, which equals to the auditor's expected total cost, E(C): 
𝐸(𝐶) = 𝑐𝑞 + 𝐸(𝑑)𝐸(𝑙) 
Where: 
c = the cost of external audit resources per unit  
q = the quantity of resources utilized by the auditor  
E(d) = the expected present value of possible litigation costs or other losses  
E(l) = the possibility of the auditor having to make this period's occurred losses good from 
the audited financial statements.  
E(C), the auditor's expected cost, includes costs of resources used as well as costs for bearing 
risk of potential litigation and for having to make occurred losses good. So the audit fee 
consists of the amount of work used in the audit as well as firm-specific factors that increase 
the auditor’s risk. Auditors have incentives to incorporate possible risks into the audit fees. 
High degree of leverage, poor liquidity and accounting losses are some firm-specific factors 
affecting the firm’s risk and therefore also auditor’s litigation risk, and they are likely to be 
included in the audit price. (Simunic, 1980)  
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The audit pricing model assumes that the auditor's expected costs are a function of the 
auditee's financial reporting system, since the cost parameter c includes all of the costs of a 
unit of q; quantity of resources utilized. The financial reporting system affects for example 
leases that can be omitted from the balance sheet if they fall in the definition of operating 
leases. In a normal technical auditing model the auditor's audit program design is a function 
of the auditee's internal accounting system as well as the financial reporting system, and the 
quantity of auditing demanded by the auditee will result from an equalization of benefits and 
costs, as the audit service is an economic good to the auditee. Thus, there is a legal liability 
of auditing to stakeholders, which also drives the design of financial reporting system and 
audit process. (Simunic, 1980) 
4.3 AUDITEE ATTRIBUTES 
Size of the auditee is the most dominant audit fee determinant in all the audit fee literature. 
In practice, it is logical that audits of larger companies require more time and effort from 
auditors than smaller ones, which must have an effect on audit fees. According to Hay, 
Knechel and Wong (2006) the auditee size explains 70% of the audit fees. Typically the size 
is measured by the company's total assets and it is expected to have a positive relationship 
with audit fees. Also in some studies yearly sales are used as a variable for size, and it is 
expected to have a positive association with audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006).  
The complexity of auditee firm is another widely recognized determinant of audit fee. The 
more complex the auditee firm, the more the audit process requires effort and time. (Simunic, 
1980; Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997; Hay et al. 2006) In literature, complexity of a firm is 
measured with many different metrics, of which a few typical ones being the number of 
subsidiaries, foreign subsidiaries, business segments, audit locations or Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes that make up the client. (Hay, knechel, Wong, 2006) In Simunic’s 
(1980) paper decentralization and diversification are examples of complexity, as they 
increase the number of decision centers in an organization whose activities need to be 
monitored. 
The risk in an audit consists of audit risk and auditor's business risk. Audit risk is the risk 
that financial statements are materially misstated even though auditor issues an unqualified 
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opinion, and business risk is the risk of professional loss or injury due to litigation or such 
events affecting the auditor's business negatively (Thornton & Moore, 1993). Audit risk can 
be reduced by performing appropriate audit tests (Thornton & Moore, 1993; Stice, 1991), 
but business risk is seen as an inherent risk, which is an evident factor affecting the audit fee 
as companies charge higher hourly fees to compensate for the risk as the have to perform 
specialized audit procedures to compensate the risk (Stice, 1991).  
Without charging extra for hourly hours, auditors would prefer to allocate their time to less 
risky clients and thus it would affect the working of audit markets (Simunic, 1980; Thornton 
& Moore, 1993) By increasing effort to reduce risks, auditors increase audit quality and audit 
fees, even though the effort can not eliminate litigation risk completely. Therefore studies 
suggest auditors may charge a fee premium to manage the residual risk from higher litigation 
risk. (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Simunic & Stein, 1996) 
Stice (1991) studied the litigation risks of auditors who were increasingly being sued, and 
identified several client related characteristics that were associated with lawsuits against 
auditors. The industry, asset structure, financial condition, market value and variability of 
returns each influenced the likelihood of litigation, and therefore increased the inherent risk 
related to an audit. According to Stice (1991) auditors should take these items into 
consideration when evaluating the appropriate risk level and audit fee.  
Most frequently used metrics for the inherent risk are receivables and inventories, and 84% 
of studies show significant positive relationship between audit fees and the combination 
proxy of receivables and inventory. These balance sheet items vary a lot depending on 
different events and occasions and therefore their valuation requires forecasts of future 
events, which is complex, and specific auditing procedures are required for these accounts. 
(Simunic, 1980; Stice, 1991; Hay et al. 2006)  
Simunic (1980) uses other metrics for risk, including loss in the last three years and net 
income scaled by total assets. Client profitability can also be another measure of risk, so the 
more financially unstable the client firm is the more risk the auditor bears and transfers to its 
fees. (Simunic, 1980) Debt ratio can be used to measure the risk of a client failing and 
leverage has been found to have an association with audit fees as the increased risk of 
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financial distress transfers into the fees. (Simunic, 1980) Leverage is usually measured by 
the ratio of debt to assets or by quick ratio. The expected association of fees with debt to 
assets is positive and association with quick ratio negative.  
Profitability is usually measured by net income divided by total assets or by a dummy 
variable for the existence of a loss. The expected association between fees and return on 
assets is negative and the association with loss positive. (Hay et al. 2006) Both of these 
measures, profitability and leverage, have mixed results in relation to audit fees, but these 
attributes are still important when considering audit fee determinants and are proven to affect 
audit fees with a moderate certainty. (Dhaliwal et al. 2008; Simunic & Stein, 1996;  Simunic, 
1980; Hay et al., 2006)  
Internal controls affect audit fees because they affect the whole reporting process, which 
then defines the auditing process. High quality audit is a function of high quality financial 
reporting, including high quality internal controls. (DeFond & Zhang, 2014) Investments on 
internal controls profit external reporting quality and therefore audit quality. (Thornton & 
Moore, 1993) Audit quality affects audit fees, so internal controls of the auditee firm can be 
seen to affect the audit fees. 
Simunic (1980) found that loss exposures vary within industries and therefore industry can 
affect audit fees. Some industries are harder to audit (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006) and 
for example manufacturing companies with extensive inventory or receivables, which 
account for metrics of inherent risk, are riskier and harder to audit than financial institutions 
and utility companies. (Hay et al., 2006) A study by Peel and Roberts (2003) found that 
micro-firms operating in the highly competitive manufacturing sector in the UK were willing 
to pay a premium to be audited and preferred to be audited by a mid-tier or Big N auditor, 
with the latter charging higher premium. This implies that smaller firms are willing to pay 
to benefit from the reputation and signaling effect. (Peel & Roberts, 2003) 
Some studies have shown a relationship between the form of firm ownership and audit fees. 
Some forms of ownership can be seen as more risky and therefore increase audit risks. The 
form of ownership affects the agency costs and auditor's potential exposures to liability. 
Ownership is usually measured by a dummy variable for public versus private company, a 
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stock versus mutual company or the existence of a major stockholder, with the first two 
proxies having significant positive results. (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006) 
Other auditee related attributes affecting audit fees are improved corporate governance 
which implies that the control environment is more effective (Hay et al., 2006) and Board 
characteristics, since a more independent, diligent and expert board may demand higher audit 
quality through greater assurance and more audit work, which increases the audit fee as 
auditors pass additional costs on to the client. (Carcello et al., 2002).  
Also, Redmayne et al. (2011) studied the association between audit committees and audit 
fees in the public sector. Their findings suggest that in the public-benefit sector audit 
committees are effective at reducing audit fees, when more auditing is required due to high 
risk resulting from current year losses or high business risk. Therefore, audit committees are 
an important governance mechanism that has importance in the audit process. They also 
found that for profit-oriented firms' audit committees are positively associated with audit 
fees, but the association is not significant. (Redmayne et al., 2011) 
Krishnan and Sengupta (2011) conducted a study similar to this thesis, examining how 
auditors perceive off-balance sheet items, namely operating leases and pension obligations. 
Their findings suggest that client’s off balance sheet items do have an effect on audit fees, 
but the effect is different for operating leases and pension obligations, as off-balance sheet 
leases are positively associated with audit fees whereas pension obligations have the same 
effect on audit fees whether on- or off-the balance sheet. (Krishnan and Sengupta, 2011)  
A recent French study examined the effects of transitioning to IFRS on audit fees. Large 
French listed companies' were used in the study sample, and their transition into IFRS was 
found associated with a significant increase in the amount of audit fees. (Loukil, 2016) This 
implies that regulation and in particular changes in it can affect audit fees, and normal 
reasoning also supports the view that it certainly demands more time and effort to audit when 
new regulation has to be taken into consideration. 
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4.4 AUDITOR ATTRIBUTES 
First auditor quality and its origins are discussed, and how it affects audit fees. High audit 
quality equals greater assurance of high financial reporting quality. (DeFond & Zhang, 2014) 
Audit market landscape has changed for clients and auditors during recent years because of 
the financial crises, growing standards and more complex transactions. It has evidently 
changed the supply and demand dynamics of audit markets as well as the drivers of audit 
quality as a result. So the higher audit quality gives assurance that the financial statements 
faithfully reflect the firm's underlying economics, conditioned on its financial reporting 
system and innate characteristics. (Dechow et al., 2010, DeFond & Zhang, 2014)  
DeAngelo (1981) first suggested that auditor size and audit quality are related, when 
regulators and small audit firms argued that auditor quality is independent from firm size. 
Even though auditor size was known to affect the auditor choices by clients, it was seen as a 
result of less public knowledge of small firms. DeAngelo (1981) gives a definition of audit 
quality, containing both of these elements; 1) discovery of breach in the client's accounting 
system and 2) reporting of the breach. The discovery depends on the auditor's technological 
capabilities and the extent of audit procedures when the latter depends of the auditor's 
independence from the client, and the auditor's independence is higher with big auditor firms. 
Audit quality as such is hard and costly to evaluate as the probabilities of the two events are 
not directly observable and therefore auditor size is the best and least costly alternative to 
correlate with quality, as the size is publicly known information. Large auditors also have 
incentives to maintain a certain quality level because it allows them to charge higher fees 
and maintain reputation. (DeAngelo, 1981) 
There is also more recent literature of audit size and quality. A study by Chan and Wu (2011) 
continued from DeAngelo's (1981) study and found that audit firm mergers in China increase 
audit quality if the auditor independence increases and therefore reporting of a breach 
becomes more likely (see DeAngelo’s audit quality definition above). Contrary to Chan and 
Wu’s (2011) study about mergers, Deng et al., (2014) found that joint audits of one big and 
small audit firm can decrease audit quality compared to a single big firm's audit. According 
to them, the information quality from a joint audit does not exceed the costs of the 
cooperation and is therefore unprofitable. In addition, André et al. (2015) found that joint 
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audits increase audit fees, but not through higher quality. In France joint audits are 
mandatory to improve the audit market, and by comparing listed companies in France, Italy 
and UK, André et al. (2015) found that audit fees were significantly higher in France. Since 
the quality was not better, mandated joint audits did not increase audit market efficiency. 
Nevertheless, studies have suggested that larger audit firms provide higher quality auditing 
because they are independent and have more industry-specific expertise and knowledge 
within compared to smaller firms. (O'Keefe & Westort, 1992; Francis, 2004) Bigger auditing 
firms also have more incentives to provide high quality service as they have reputation to 
maintain (Dopuch & Simunic, 1980; Khurana & Raman, 2004). In the literature, the Big N 
– currently Big 4 – have been considered separately and compared with other auditing firms 
providing the same services, due to their apparent dominant position. This dominant position  
affects the pricing power of services provided by the Big N. (Campa, 2013) 
The relationship between legal liabilities and audit quality is widely studied and the results 
seem to be similar, suggesting that higher litigation risk leads to increased audit quality 
(Radhakrishnan, 1999; Liu & Wang, 2006), and larger penalties for audit failures lead to 
higher audit fees and overinvestment in audit effort, and these in part decrease auditor 
shirking and audit failures. (Newman et al., 2005; Deng et al., 2014). Therefore, improved 
audit quality comes from increased effort and effort is compensated by higher fees. 
Nevertheless there are opposing results suggesting that higher litigation risk lowers audit 
quality because increased litigation costs do not affect audit effort significantly and it can 
lead to conservative or strategic reporting, which only decreases financial statement 
relevance and quality. (Deng et al., 2014) 
The majority of studies indicating that the Big N 's provide better auditing than other firms  
show that this high quality auditing comes at the cost of clients as the firms do add a “fee 
premium” to their audit prices (Gonthier-Besacier & Schatt, 2007; Vermeer et al., 2009). 
This fee premium can be as much as 50% higher than the fees paid to smaller auditors, or 
even twice the amount, if client selection is controlled (Ireland & Lennox, 2002), and it is 
found across a variety of nations over the world (DeFond et al., 2000).  
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Big N auditors are also associated with measures that are related to improved reporting 
quality, and clients of large auditors give more frequent, timely, informative management 
forecasts and smaller absolute management earnings forecast errors, as well as have higher 
financial reporting quality ( Francis & Wang, 2008; Ball et al., 2012;  Francis et al., 2013; 
DeFond & Zhang, 2014) The market perceives Big N audited financial information as more 
valuable, as earnings response coefficients (ERC) are larger for Big N audited financial 
statements (Teoh & Wong, 1993). Before initial public offerings Big N auditors are better 
able to predict future delisting when compared to non-Big N auditors and therefore firms 
often switch to Big N auditors before going public (Weber & Willenborg, 2003; DeAngelo, 
1981). 
However, opposite results of the relationship between audit quality and Big N audit firms 
also exist, as several empirical studies (Petroni & Beasley, 1996; Chaney, 2004; Lawrence 
et al., 2011) question the good quality of Big N audit firms. Petroni & Beasley (1996) found 
no systematic difference between the audit quality of different size audit firms and they 
implied that small firms may even provide more effort to auditing some risky accounts.  
Chaney et al. (2004) found evidence that the fee premium of Big N firms disappears after 
self-selecting the client, which is contrary to Ireland and Lennox’s (2002) study suggesting 
that controlling the client selection can lead to highest audit fee premiums. Chaney et al. 
(2004) further argue that auditee firms do not even see Big N auditors as superior in terms 
of the perceived quality, for it to be able to affect audit fees and allow auditors to charge fee 
premiums. 
The study by Lawrence et al., (2011) provided a new, challenging insight to the field of audit 
fee research, as it suggested the difference in audit quality does not depend so much on the 
auditor but more of the client characteristics. Big N companies have large and important 
client firms, which have more resources to invest in better accounting systems and internal 
control systems as well as have access to highly skilled professionals and directors affecting 
the audit department and committee, and they value these opportunities as they are under 
close media scrutiny. (Lawrence et al., 2011; Campa, 2013) In addition, a study of Big 4’s 
in the UK argued that the structure of the oligopolistic auditing market is not competitive 
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and therefore high audit fees are result of the oligopolistic market power and not the result 
of better quality. (House of Lords, 2010b; Campa, 2013)  
Hay et al. (2006) found that auditor tenure affects fees as clients may change auditors in 
order to get a lower fee from a new auditor, which may also be a strategic way for auditors 
to get clients. Auditor tenure is usually measured by a dummy variable reflecting auditor 
change and actual duration of current auditor’s tenure. Evidence supports the view that audit 
fees are lower in relative new audit engagements.  
Also the location of the auditor affects audit fees in some countries, as auditors from the 
metropolitan centres charge higher costs. (Hay et al. 2006) Zaman et al. (2011) found 
positive association between audit fees and audit committee effectiveness. Also, Ittonen and 
Petri (2012) found the sex of the auditor to affect charged fees, as according to them women 
charge more, possibly due to adding extra work required or increasing the risk premium. 
Auditor's financial distress and financial restatements are also found to affect audit fees, and 
for financial restatements they are less likely for firms with higher fees (Simunic, 1980; 
Blankley et al., 2012).  
There are many additional attributes affecting audit fees, for example some external 
attributes related to the audit environment, the economic situation or increased regulation, 
and the purpose of this literature review is to give an extensive insight to audit fee research, 
therefore only including all of the most important and relevant studies.  
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5 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
After the theories and prior findings discussed, I am able to develop and present my research 
hypothesis. The hypothesis is based on the assumptions and findings of existing literature, 
and my research questions are following: 
1. Are operating leases relevant to auditors and do they contain incremental explanatory power when capitalized? If they are relevant, what kind of effect do they have on audit fees? 
2. Are the effects of assets and capitalized operating lease assets equal to audit fees?  
Auditing is valued and demanded because it provides independent assurance of the 
credibility of accounting information, and therefore adds value to financial statements. 
(DeFond & Zhang, 2014) Auditor examines essential documents related to a statement and 
gives a view on how well the financial statement presents a true and fair view of the firm’s 
performance. Auditing provides stakeholders assurance to properly evaluate the company.  
Auditors, in exchange of auditing, charge audit fees according to the effort and time needed 
to perform the audit. Auditors have incentives to incorporate possible risks and costs into the 
audit fee, as audit fee is usually determined before the audit. (Simunic, 1980) Just as auditing, 
capitalizing operating leases can be seen as a legal liability to stakeholders, most specifically 
to investors, as both of the actions help investors better evaluate the possible risks and returns 
of a company. Ge (2006) found that investors seem to misprice footnote information, even 
though it contains incremental explanatory power in predicting future earnings and stock 
returns beyond balance sheet information.  
By bringing operating leases to the balance sheet the transparency of the financial statement 
increases as company's funding methods are exposed. Capitalization affects positively 
investors' risk and firms’ performance calculations by lowering their required effort to 
evaluate a firm's true situation, (Cornaggia et al., 2012) and this might reflect to auditing 
also. The more a firm discloses and gives available information, and therefore reduces risks, 
the less it requires audit procedures performed, and this decreased effort leads to lower audit 
fees. (Stice, 1991; Simunic & Stein, 1996; DeFond & Zhang, 2014)  
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In audit fee studies the most important and almost unanimously recognized audit fee 
determinants are auditee related, i.e. the size, complexity and risks of the auditee firm. Also, 
some auditor related determinants are widely recognized, i.e. the auditor size and quality. 
There are many different attributes found to affect the audit fee and for many of them there 
exists mixed results, but I find it evident that changes in the auditee firm's reporting and 
financial statement disclosure affects the auditing process and thus the audit fees. 
Operating leases are favourable and important to many companies, which implies that 
information about them is valuable to investors and that audited information is even more 
valuable. Capitalization brings off-balance sheet operating leases from the footnotes to the 
balance sheet and this increased reporting disclosure increases transparency of the financial 
statement, which helps auditors by lowering business risk. Reduced risk usually leads to 
lower audit fees. (Stice, 1991; Thornton & Moore, 1993, DeFond & Zhang, 2014) 
Capitalizing operating leases on to the balance sheet affects the asset and liability based 
profitability ratios, as well as changes the expense structure. (Imhoff et al., 1991; Jennings 
& Marques, 2013)  
When operating leases are constructively capitalized, the assets related to the lease contracts 
are to be recognized as depreciable assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. After 
capitalization, total assets contain all the assets related to operating leases. Therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that the effects of total assets and constructively capitalized operating 
lease assets are similar to audit fees, as they are part of the same audit fee attribute; total 
assets. In audit fee studies, total assets are the most usual proxy for client size, which is the 
most important audit fee determinant. (Hay et al., 2006) Because total assets are expected to 
have a positive effect on audit fees, capitalized operating lease assets are also expected to 
have a similar positive effect on audit fees as they become part of total assets when 
capitalized. 
Based on the arguments presented above as well as the prior studies discussed, I expect 
capitalized operating leases to be relevant to auditors and have incremental explanatory 
power over audit fees. Also, I expect the effects of capitalized operating lease assets and total 
balance sheet assets on audit fees to be equal. The hypotheses for this study are: 
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H1: Operating leases are relevant to auditors and constructively capitalized operating 
leases contain incremental explanatory power over audit fees. Capitalized operating 
leases correlate positively with audit fees. 
H2: Capitalized operating lease assets and total assets have an equal effect on audit 
fees and there is a linear relationship between them. 
The method used to study the relationship of operating leases and audit fees is OLS 
regression analysis. If the results of the regression analysis suggest that capitalized operating 
leases have incremental explanatory power over the audit fees, then it implies that the new 
IFRS 16 standard forcing companies to recognize operating leases in their balance sheet 
would benefit auditors. If the effects of capitalization would have negative value to audit 
fees, so that capitalization of leases would lower the audit price, the new IFRS 16 regulation 
and capitalization of leases would still be positive for auditors because they profit from 
increased relevancy of financial statements.  
The increased relevancy through capitalization could be thought to decrease audit fees, as 
capitalization increases transparency and decreases some possible risks, but I assume it to 
increase audit fees because when on the balance sheet an item needs to be audited which 
requires time and effort of some kind. When new items are capitalized on the balance sheet, 
auditors have more auditing to perform. Therefore if capitalized leases have an effect of any 
kind to audit fees, it is most likely that it is positive.  
It is also tested whether the effect of capitalized operating leases to audit fees is equal to the 
effect of total assets to audit fees, and if it is, it would mean that when the effect of capitalized 
operating leases doubles, the effect of assets doubles also. Thus there would be a linear 
relationship between the variables and they would change equally. This would suggest that 
the overall amount of the assets would matter the most to auditors and audit fees, and not the 
content of the assets.  
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6 DATA, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION AND RESEARCH 
MODEL 
This study quantitatively analyzes the relation between audit fees and operating leases. The 
data is obtained from Compustat and Audit Analytics databases and it is collected from North 
American companies, excluding financing corporations with SIC code 6000-6999 because 
they usually do not have operating leases as they do not operate with equipment. A total of 
731373 observations from the years 2000-2016 were used for the analysis, after omitting 
observations with missing values.  
As firms are required by FAS 13 to report the minimum payments of non-cancellable 
operating leases for the following five years, as well as lump sum for thereafter years, I was 
able to get this data about operating leases from Compustat for chosen firms between the 
years 2000-2016. The method for calculating constructively capitalized operating leases 
from this data is presented below. By using this method I am able to get the test variables 
needed for the regression analysis.  
The main independent variables studied are variables representing capitalized operating 
leases and assets (logCAP_A and logCAP_LIAB), which were constructed using the method 
introduced by Imhoff et al. (1991). First, the capitalized lease liability is calculated. From 
Compustat, future lease payments for the next five years and a lump sum for all later years 
are obtained, and the first step is to discount those future lease payments and the lump sum 
with a borrowing rate to get the amount of estimated lease liability.  
As borrowing rates are not available for the observations, I chose a reasonable constant 8% 
interest rate. The sum of the discounted lease liabilities represents the off-balance sheet lease 
liability that is capitalized (CAP_LIAB) and which is then transformed to logarithm 
(logCAP_LIAB).  
Secondly, the capitalized leased asset is estimated by examining the relationship between 
leased assets and debt (ARL). A few assumptions are necessary: 1) an estimate of the total 
life of the asset – it is hard to assess and therefore increases the errors in calculation, 2) a 
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method of depreciation – a straight-line depreciation is normally used for assets and therefore 
it is also assumed to be the case here, 3) an assumption that the leased assets are 100 percent 
financed by debt and that the value of the assets is zero after the last lease payments.  
The straight-line amortization method recognizes that the value of the leased asset will 
decline more quickly after inception of the lease than the value of the lease liability, and the 
average ratio of the leased assets to the liabilities, ARL, is calculated for every observation 
by using the following formula: 
 
𝐴𝐿𝑅 =
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−𝑁
𝑟 (
𝑅𝑒𝑚
𝑁 )
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−𝑅𝑒𝑚
𝑟
 
 
Where 
𝐴𝐿𝑅 = average ratio of leased asset to leased liability  
𝑟 = company's average borrowing rate, here 8%  
𝑁 = number of years future lease payments are expected for 
𝑅𝑒𝑚 = N/2 
I assume the average borrowing rate to be 8 percent, as I assumed above in calculation the 
capitalized lease liability. I do not have information about the number of years, so I use a 
model by Jennings & Marques (2013) to calculate N: 
𝑁 = 5 +
𝑃𝑚𝑡𝑟
𝑃𝑚𝑡𝑡+5
 
Where 
𝑁 = number of years future lease payments are expected for 
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𝑃𝑚𝑡𝑟 = lump sum of lease payments for the years beyond the fifth year 
𝑃𝑚𝑡𝑡+5 = fifth year’s lease payment 
Then the previously calculated leased liabilities are multiplied with ARL to get the amount 
of capitalized leased assets (CAP_A), which is then transformed to logarithm (logCAP_A) 
to reduce skewedness of values and to help interpret the results. It is typical for audit fee 
studies to have variables transformed to logarithms to increase the linear relationship of 
variables to audit fees. A log-log model operates with percentages and an independent 
variables coefficient of -0,5 means that 1% increase in that particular variable decreases the 
dependent variable by 0,5%. 
In addition to the test variable of capitalized operating leases, regression model also includes 
control variables that affect audit fees according to studies. Some of the control variables 
were obtained straight from Compustat or AuditAnalytics, and some were calculated based 
on other values obtained from the two databases.  
Control variables include the book value of assets measuring the size of the audited firm 
(logAT), debtness measuring the riskiness and debtness of the firm (LT/AT), a dummy 
variable measuring auditor size (BIG4), a dummy variable measuring financial stability and 
risk of the firm (LOSS), a dummy variable measuring whether auditing is to be done at 
auditors’ busy period (BusyPeriod) and finally a variable (year) that represents the year 
dummies of the data from 2000 to 2016, to control for the yearly differences of audit fees in 
our model. 
Data obtained from Compustat contained book values of assets and liabilities, net income, 
financial year end and the year of the data. Dummy variable LOSS was obtained from the 
net income and BusyPeriod from financial year end. The dummy variable LOSS gets a value 
of one if the company had a negative net income last financial year and zero if not, and the 
dummy variable Busy Period gets a value of one if the company’s financial year ends in 
December, otherwise it is zero.  
From Audit Analytics I was able to get data about audit fees as well as auditors, and BIG4 
dummy was made based on the auditor. The dummy variable BIG4 gets a value of one if the 
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auditing company if one of the Big four auditing firms – KPMG, EY, PWC or Deloitte, 
otherwise the value is zero. The dependent variable in this study is the logarithm of audit 
fees (logAF), which is obtained directly from Audit Analytics. 
Below is the regression model used in this study, followed by a summary of all the variables 
and their expected signs. 
 
Regression model: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝐹𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑇𝑡 +
𝐿𝑇
𝐴𝑇
+ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 + 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑒 
 
Table 4: Variables used in the regression model 
Variable Description Expected sign 
logAFt Logarithm of  total audit fees at the end of fiscal year  
logATt Logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year + 
LT/AT Liabilities/assets; debtness + 
logCAP_At Logarithm of capitalized assets at the end of fiscal year + 
BIG4t Binary being 1 if auditor is a Big 4 and 0 if not + 
LOSSt Binary being 1 if firm experienced financial loss previous year and 0 if no + 
BusyPeriodt Binary being 1 if firm's financial period ends at December and 0 if not + 
yeart Vector of the year dummies for 2000-2016 +  
I expect total assets and debtness to have a significant, positive effect on audit fees. Also, I 
expect the effect to be positive for all of the other variables. Capitalized operating lease 
liabilities, logCAP_LIAB, as well as total liabilities were omitted from this model due to 
multicollinearity problems. Total liabilities correlated significantly with assets and 
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capitalized lease liabilities correlated significantly with capitalized lease assets, therefore it 
was necessary to omit variables related to assets or liabilities. Multicollinearity problems are 
discussed in more detail in the results chapter.  
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7 RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
This paragraph presents the results and findings of the empirical analysis, starting from the 
descriptive statistics and then continuing with a correlation analysis, along with the 
multicollinearity issues discussed. Then the results of the regression model are presented and 
the findings are analyzed. Finally the possible hypothesis realization is discussed. 
7.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the final research variables, excluding the year 
dummies which are not relevant in this phase. Additionally, descriptive statistics of the 
original values before transformation to logarithm are included to give perspective, as well 
as the variable logCAP_LIAB which is omitted from the final analysis. Table 5 reports 
minimum, first quartile, third quartile, maximum, mean, median and standard deviation for 
all of the variables. The total sample size is 731373.  
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
N=731373 Minimum Q1 Q3 Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
AF* 0 0.174 1.465 22.375 1.367 0.561 2.357 
AT* 0 0 0.002 0.297 0.003 0.003 0.012 
CAP_A* 0 0 0 0.003 0 0 0 
CAP_LIAB* 0 0 0 0.004 0 0 0 
logAF 5.226 12.101 14.209 16.923 13.157 13.260 1.507 
logAT -3.170 4.051 7.447 12.602 5.726 5.824 2.394 
logCAP_A -3.768 0.312 0.710 7.868 2.139 2.158 2.353 
logCAP_LIAB -3.727 0.440 3.888 8.171 2.368 2.406 2.416 
LT/AT 0.028 0.628 4.172 16.065 0.620 0.512 0.805 
BIG4 0 0 1 1 0.698 1 0.459 
LOSS 0 0 1 1 0.397 0 0.489 
BusyPeriod 0 0 1 1 0.694 1 0.460 
* = value is in millions 
       
First, the table 5 reports statistics for the original values in millions. For the variable audit 
fees (AF), the standard deviation of original values is higher than of logarithm values, but 
for all the other variables with original values it is much lower, almost zero or zero. Also the 
other statistics are close to zero or zero (millions) for the original values, except for the audit 
fees that have a great range of different values in the data, ranging from zero to 22 millions.  
This proves that it was reasonable to transform these variables into logarithms because the 
monetary changes are not so easy to interpret as the percentage changes. Values are 
transformed to logarithms to reduce skewedness and to improve the normality of values, and 
without the transformation the descriptive table would show different, more radical values, 
that would further distort the results (see statistics of the original values in table 5).  
Another thing that affects the data is that the tails of our data values were winsorized to 1 
and 99 percent levels by changing the extreme values to minimum and maximum percent 
values. This simplifies and makes our regression analysis more reliable as extreme values 
are limited, but not deleted completely. 
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The dependent variable logAF ranges from 5.226 to 16.923, with the mean of 13.157 and 
median 13.260. There is some amount of variation in the amount of audit fees, but mostly 
they are in the upper part of the scale. The standard deviation for logAF is 1.570, as for the 
original values of AF it is 2.357, so the transformation to logarithm reduced the variation in 
audit fees. 
The variable logAT has a standard deviation of 2.394, implying that there is quite much 
variation in the amount of assets and therefore in firm size. Three variables; logAT, 
logCAP_A, logCAP_LIAB, have negative values as minimum, which means that the 
original data for assets as well as the results of capitalization calculations had very low 
minimum values close to zero, since values below one become negative when transformed 
to logarithm. By checking the original data obtained from the research base, it is visible that 
there are values of assets that are very close to zero. CAP_LIAB and CAP_A were calculated 
by using the constructive capitalization formula by Imhoff et al. (1991), and in the results of 
calculations there were values close to zero, which became negative when transformed to 
logarithm.  
LogLT was omitted from the final regression analysis, and it does not bring anything 
valuable to the descriptive statistics therefore it is not included in the table. Also, 
logCAP_LIAB was omitted from the regression model, but I chose to include it here as it 
contains interesting information and helps in interpretation of logCAP_A. Logarithm values 
of capitalized assets and liabilities are at similar level, because logCAP_A is calculated from 
logCAP_LIAB and it is a percentage of logCAP_LIAB. 
The variable LT/AT, the ratio of total debt to total assets, measures the financial risk of a 
firm and the values range from the minimum 0.028 to the maximum 16.065, the average 
value being 0.62, median 0.512 and standard deviation 0.805. This shows that the majority 
of LT/AT values are closer to the minimum, i.e. that the amount of debt is mostly a bit lower 
than the amount of firm's assets, and that the maximum value is of a rare situation where 
debt significantly exceeds assets.  
The dummy variables BIG4, LOSS and BusyPeriod get either zero or one as a value. For the 
variable BIG4, the mean 0.698 means that nearly 70% of firms were audited by a BIG4 
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auditor. For the variable LOSS, almost 40% of firms reported loss in the previous financial 
period. For BusyPeriod. nearly 70% of firms have a financial period ending in December, 
which makes the first months of a calendar year very busy as 70% of firms issue financial 
statements around the same time and they have to be audited, assuming all of them are 
obliged to provide a financial statement and get it audited. 
7.2 CORRELATION ANALYSIS AND MULTICOLLINEARITY 
7.2.1 Pearson and Spearman correlations 
Table 6 shows Pearson and Spearman correlations for the regression model variables. 
Pearson correlation measures the linear relationship between two continuous variables and 
Spearman correlation measures the monotonic relationship that is the rank correlation 
between two variables. Both correlations get values between +1 and -1, where +1 means 
total positive correlation, -1 means total negative correlation and 0 means no correlation or 
relationship. So the sign of the correlation coefficient indicates the direction of the 
relationship and the number indicates the level of the relationship.  
Pearson and Spearman correlations are sensitive to extreme data values, which I have 
winsorized by smoothing extreme values. It is important to keep in mind that it is not 
appropriate to proclaim a whole causal relationships between two variables only by their 
correlation, since this is not a controlled environment and also other matters affect the 
relationships.  
As Pearson and Spearman correlations only measure correlations of two variables, the final 
regression analysis brings more significant results. Nevertheless, correlation analysis helps 
in detecting and interpreting important variables' relationships, and most importantly it helps 
detect multicollinearity, which is an unfavorable phenomenon in which two or more 
variables in a regression model are highly correlated.  
If there is too much correlation between some variables, the results about individual predictor 
variables are biased, even though the overall results of the model are not affected, meaning 
that the independent variables still explain the dependent variable. Failure to detect and 
report multicollinearity can lead to misleading results and unrealistic interpretations of the 
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results. Therefore it is important to test for multicollinearity to be able to interpret the data 
from the regression analysis more carefully. (Vatcheva et al., 2016) For detecting 
multicollinearity, I analyse the correlations as well as examine the tolerance and variance 
inflation factor values of the variables.
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Table 6: Pearson and Spearman correlations 
 Pearson correlations        
Spearman's rho logAF logAT logLT LT/AT logCAP_A logCAP_LIAB BIG4 LOSS BusyPeriod 
logAF 1 0.783 0.765 -0.100 0.685 0.681 0.532 -0.320 0.081 
logAT 0.795 1 0.956 -0.197 0.785 0.783 0.540 -0.440 0.097 
logLT 0.777 0.967 1 0.015 0.781 0.779 0.498 -0.390 0.110 
LT/AT 0.164 0.188 0.403 1 -0.093 -0.094 -0.128 0.162 0.034 
logCAP_A 0.700 0.794 0.792 0.204 1 0.999 0.487 -0.341 0.013 
logCAP_LIAB 0.697 0.793 0.792 0.206 0.999 1 0.485 -0.342 0.014 
BIG4 0.538 0.538 0.506 0.017 0.490 0.487 1 -0.217 0.073 
LOSS -0.324 -0.437 -0.392 0.081 -0.343 -0.344 -0.217 1 0.035 
BusyPeriod 0.078 0.097 0.106 0.086 0.014 0.014 0.073 0.035 1  
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From looking at the table 6 we are able to see that logCAP_A and logCAP_LIAB are strongly 
positively correlated for Pearson and Spearman correlations, which is expected as logCAP_A 
is calculated as a percentage from logCAP_LIAB. This almost perfect correlation implies there 
are collinearity issues if both of these variables are further included in the regression analysis. 
Also logAT and logLT are quite highly positively correlated, which is why logLT is omitted 
from further analysis.  
The dependent variable logAF quite highly correlates with logAT, logLT, logCAP_A, 
logCAP_LIAB and BIG4. This would imply that audit fees correlate with client firm's size, 
auditor's size and the amount of client firm's capitalized operating leases. Also, logAF has 
negative moderate correlation to LOSS, which would imply that client firm's recent financial 
distress has an effect on audit fees. For both correlations, LT/AT and BusyPeriod have a light 
correlation with logAF, but the LT/AT value for Pearson is negative as for Spearman it is 
positive.  
7.2.2 Collinearity statistics 
Since there are strong correlations between the variables, multicollinearity analysis is needed. 
Multicollinearity between variables is analysed with tolerance and variance inflation factor 
(VIF). Tolerance measures multicollinearity and it calculates the interval within which a 
proportion of the sample falls, and VIF measures how much the variance of a variable increases 
because of multicollinearity. Tolerance is calculated as 1 - R²j  , where R is the coefficient of 
the variable j, and the minimum value for it is recommended to be 0.1. VIF is calculated as 
1/tolerance and it should stay under the value 10, otherwise there is a multicollinearity problem.  
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Table 7: Collinearity statistics 
1.  Tolerance VIF 
logAT 0.300 3.329 
LT/AT 0.939 1.065 
logCAP_A 0.368 2.721 
BIG4 0.684 1.462 
LOSS 0.794 1.260 
BusyPeriod 0.949 1.053 
2. Tolerance VIF 
logAT 0.038 26.072 
logLT 0.042 23.803 
LT/AT 0.485 2.064 
logCAP_A 0.002 622.556 
logCAP_LIAB 0.002 617.889 
BIG4 0.676 1.479 
LOSS 0.788 1.270 
BusyPeriod 0.946 1.057 
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Table 7 reports multicollinearity statistics for two different models. The first model (1.) is the 
research model used in the final regression analysis and the second model (2.) includes also 
some other variables to illustrate how they would distort the results if they were included. Table 
7 indicates that there is no collinearity issues for the variables in the final regression model 
(1.), as tolerance is over 0.1 and VIF is under 10 for all of the variables. However, the 
collinearity results of model 2. including additional variables logLT and logCAP_LIAB which 
were omitted form the final regression analysis, show tolerances under 0.1 and VIF’s over 10. 
By including them in the regression analysis the results would have been distorted as logAT 
and logLT are correlated and logCAP_A and logCAP_LIAB are very highly correlated. The 
Pearson and Spearman correlation table above also shows this unwanted correlation effect of 
the variables.  
Table 8: Results of the regression analysis 
Constant Expected sign Coefficients T-value 
Intercept  10.897 732.18 
logAT + 0.342 469.49 
LTAT + 0.072 57.92 
logCAP_A + 0.113 168.99 
BIG4 + 0.562 222.76 
LOSS + 0.052 23.58 
BusyPeriod + 0.048 22.44 
Year dummies - -1.241 to -0.061 -79.07 to -4.01 
Significance <0.0001   R2 0.706    Adjusted R2 0.706     
Coefficient measures the effect of an independent variable to the dependent variable. 
Coefficients are as expected for all the other variables than the year dummies. The signs are 
positive for all of the variables except for the year dummies. Some coefficients must be 
interpreted differently than coefficients in a normal linear regression, as the values are 
transformed to logarithm. The coefficient of 0.113 for logCAP_A means that when capitalized 
operating lease assets increase 1%, the logAF increases 0.113%. For logAT and LT/AT, 
coefficients are 0.342 and 0.072, meaning that 1% increase in those values increase the 
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logarithm of audit fees by 0.342% and 0.072%. The dummy variables BIG4, LOSS and 
BusyPeriod are also positive and thus audit fees increase when auditor is one of Big 4 audit 
firms, auditee has experienced loss in the previous financial year or the audit is performed at 
the start of the calendar year when auditors have a busy period. Year dummies are included in 
this table. Coefficients for year dummies from 2000 to 2016 are surprisingly negative for all of 
the years, but they range from -1.241 to -0.061 and increase little each year, suggesting that 
over the years audit fees have increased.   
T-value measures the significance of the relationship of a variable to the dependent variable. 
For all of the variables the t-value is important, meaning that all of them have an effect on audit 
fees. Also, P-values measuring the statistical significance of variables were under 0.0001 for 
all of the variables, which confirms that all of the variables are significant. R-square measures 
the explanatory power of all the variables to the dependent variable, and an R-square below 
85% indicates good explanatory power. A low R-square indicates that the model has more error 
and warns about vague predictions. The regression model has a R-square of 0,706 meaning 
that the chosen variables explain well the changes in the dependent variable. Adjusted R-square 
measures the explanatory power of only those variables that actually affect the dependent 
variable and it is always equal to or lower than R-square. The adjusted R-square being 0,706, 
same as the R-square, means that all of the variables significantly affect the dependent variable. 
The linear relationship between the variables logAT and logCAP_A was also tested to see 
whether the effects of both variables are equal. If there would be a linear relationship, then 
their coefficients would be equal and a certain increase or decrease in one of the variables 
would results in a similar change in the other. The effects were tested along with the regression 
analysis and the results suggest there does not exist a linear relationship between the variables. 
The F-value measuring the ratio between the tested variables is 3331,31, which is significant 
and proves that the variables are not equal. If they were, their F-value would be 1.  
Overall, according to the regression analysis, auditee firm size and the auditor’s size or rather 
being part of Big 4 seem to be the most significant audit fee determinants. Their coefficients 
are the biggest and also their T-values are the most important, meaning that the relationships 
of those variables to audit fees are significant. Surprisingly, capitalized operating lease assets 
is the third most significant audit fee attribute, leaving behind debtness and previous financial 
loss of the auditee firm and busy period of the auditor. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that 
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capitalized operating leases do have an effect on audit fees and the effect is singinificant per se 
as when compared with the effects of other audit fee attributes. 
8  CONCLUSION 
8.1 DISCUSSION 
The main objective of this study was to find out if capitalizing operating leases would affect 
audit fees. Second object was to test whether the effects of capitalized operating lease assets 
and total assets are equal. The main research method was OLS regression analysis, which I 
conducted after detecting possible collinearity issues. The dependent variables were chosen 
according to previous audit fee studies and the test variable was generated according to prior 
capitalization literature and own presumptions. The variables in the research model were the 
following: 
logAT  – logarithm of client firm's total assets measuring the size of the client firm  
LT/AT  – total debt to total assets, measuring for the client firm's riskiness 
LOSS  – previous years financial loss, attribute of client firm's financial distress 
BIG4  – auditor is part of BIG4 audit firms, attribute of auditor size and quality 
BusySeason  – client's financial year ends in December, measures auditor's time and effort 
available fo audit, i.e. Busyness of auditor  
logCAP_A  – logarithm of capitalized assets, test variable measuring client firm's 
capitalized operating leases 
 
I expected all of the variables to have a positive correlation with audit fees and it turned out to 
be the case, as all of them have significant explanatory power on audit fees. Prior studies have 
found client size to explain most of audit fee changes (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006) and 
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also in this study it was one of the most important attributes affecting audit fees, together with 
the auditor size and quality. Higher audit fees are expected when the audit quality is higher and 
the most common proxy for audit quality is the auditor's belonging to BIG N (4), which also is 
a proxy for auditor size. These firms are found to include a fee premium into their charges. My 
results also imply that the variable BIG 4 is a significant audit fee attribute, but surprisingly it's 
effect exceeds the one of client size according to the coefficients, though t-value measuring 
attributes' significance to audit fees is of double amount for logAT measuring client size.  
The results suggest there is a positive relationship between capitalized operating leases and 
audit fees. This means that when more operating leases are capitalized, it increases audit fees. 
This supports the results of a similar study that found operating leases to be significantly and 
positively associated with audit fees. (Krishnan & Sengupta, 2011) According to Krishnan and 
Sengupta (2011), off-balance sheet items contribute to greater financial risk for the client and 
thus greater business risk for auditors, which is then mitigated by passing the costs to the 
clients. They found operating leases to affect audit fees and financial leases to not affect audit 
fees. The results of my study show that capitalized operating leases increases audit fees, and it 
is partly due to bringing more risky items to the balance sheet because costs for bearing greater 
risk must be incorporated in the audit fee. 
To answer the first research question, operating leases are relevant to auditors and contain 
important information, because their capitalization affects audit fees and therefore interests 
auditors. The hypothesis about the incremental explanatory power of capitalized operating 
leases and of their positive effect on audit fees is confirmed by the results. Nevertheless, there 
are other audit fee attributes affecting audit fees more, like the auditee size and risk which are 
the main explanatory variables for audit fees, but in the long run and in firms that have 
important amounts of operating leases to be capitalized the effects are bigger.  
The second research question was about the relationship of total assets and capitalized 
operating lease assets, whether they have equal effects. Their relationship is proven to be 
nonlinear and therefore their effects on audit fees are not equal to the effects of total assets, 
even though capitalizing leased assets brings them on the balance sheet to total assets. The 
second hypothesis is therefore refused by these results. This further analysis of capitalized lease 
assets proves that capitalized leases have their own importance on the balance sheet and their 
 Conclusion  
60 
effects are not dependent on or similar to other balance sheet items of which total assets would 
have been the most probable item to have similar effects. 
I expected the test variable logCAP_A to affect audit fees as prior studies and experiments 
show that capitalization of leases affects many parts of a firm's financial statement, and the 
financial statement being the main matter to auditors, changes in it must surely interest auditors. 
Therefore it is appropriate to assume that the current standards allowing companies to disclose 
operating leases only in their footnotes allow important information to be hidden from auditors 
and other interest groups.  
The legislation of operating leases is changing as the new standard IFRS 16 Leases requiring 
companies to capitalize disclose is becoming mandated in January 2019. The use of operating 
leases has increased a lot during the years and for many firms and industries operating leases 
are an important way of acquiring machinery, therefore studying the implications of 
capitalizing operating leases is a timely subject.  
This study gave an extensive review of operating leases and their legislation as well as 
presented the constructive capitalization method for operating leases. This study also presented 
an audit pricing model and discussed different audit fee determinants. After the literature 
review, in the empirical part a regression analysis was conducted to find out about the effects 
of capitalized operating leases to audit fees. The results gave a new audit fee attribute to audit 
fee research as the effects of capitalized operating leases are significant to audit fees. Also, the 
results are relevant in the field of operating leases because the significant effects of today will 
grow if companies are to capitalize important amounts of operating leases according to the 
upcoming IFRS 16. However, the significance of the effects might suggest that companies try 
to avoid capitalizing leases to avoid and minimize the negative effects it brings to the 
companies. The situation remains to be seen and in a few years the effects of the new standard 
and of the transition could be tested in practice. 
8.2 LIMITATIONS  
In order to correctly interpret the results, possible limitations must be taken into account. First 
of all, there are some general limitations that concern quantitative studies and those limitations 
also apply to this study. I have chosen the variables included in the study and excluded some 
variables that I do not consider relevant, even though they could affect the results of the model 
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if they were included. For example the provision of non-audit services by auditors is usually 
omitted from audit fee models, even though theory would suggest that charging non-audit fees 
would also affect audit fees. This problem is mainly due to the lack of public information or 
correct data. (Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006)  
Another common problem in addition to omitted variables in quantitative studies is the right 
selection of control variables. A linear relationship can be assumed too easily between a 
dependent and independent variable, even though the dependent variable would not be 
continuous. On the other hand, a continuous measure can be transformed to a constant dummy 
variable.  
I have three dummy variables in the audit fee model, and with dummy variables that classify 
data into only two measures or outcomes, the simplification can be critical and sometimes 
affect the dependent variable too much. For example, according to Hay et al. (2006), the 
continuous dummy variable 'financial loss', cutoff at zero net income, may actually not be the 
best measure of riskiness. Nevertheless, I use it as a measure of risk, which together with a 
debt-to-asset ratio in my opinion forms a good pair of risk variables. Also the amount of 
operating leases is related to financial risk, as increased off-balance sheet obligations increase 
financial risks. (Krishnan & Sengupta, 2011), 
Also, I have not included any attribute of client firm complexity in my regression model, even 
though in many studies client complexity is found to be one major attribute affect audit fees. 
In this study the main interest was in the relationship of operating leases and audit fees, and as 
I have included other important control variables measuring client size and riskiness, I chose 
to ignore the complexity factor. 
Specifically in audit fee models, there is a certain possible limitation of results, the exclusion 
of demand attributes in audit markets. Governance mechanisms are a good example of demand 
attributes, since they can create more demand for external assurance, which increases demand 
of audits (Eilifsen et al., 2001) and further could affect audit fees. Literature is largely focused 
on supply attributes of audit markets, even though also demand attributes affect audit markets 
and pricing of services on them. Other variables than the client size have faced mixed results. 
These mixed results of important variables may be due to the above stated inherent problems 
of the production based audit fee model. (Hay et al., 2006)  
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The data in this study was obtained from Compustat and Audit Analytics databases. As the 
data is entered in the database, there is a possibility of errors. Also, I do not have absolute 
certainty of the reliability of the companies' data registered to databases. This study also 
contains some presumptions in calculations, including the estimated borrowing rate of 8% and 
the estimated average life of the leased asset.  
Regardless of these limitations, the results of this study can be taken as an indication of a 
relationship between audit fees and operating leases. Many impressive, similar studies of audit 
fee determinants exist and this study contributes to the same topic with a new attribute, so I 
have no reason to doubt the research method and choices. This study contributes to the audit 
fee literature as well as to the operating lease literature by bringing new standpoints to both 
subjects. 
8.3  FURTHER RESEARCH TOPICS 
In 2019, companies are required to disclose operating leases on their balance sheet. Until then 
we can only estimate the results of capitalizing operating leases. In a few years, it would be 
interesting to study the actual effects resulting from the transition to the new standard IFRS 16. 
Have the capital structures of firms changed and have companies relying on operating leases 
modified their funding methods? As capitalizing leases affect the amount of debt and assets as 
well as some important profitability ratios, what kind of effect has this new standard had on 
investors' evaluations on firms, and do leases have a bigger role in assessing a firms potential? 
Also, the effects of capitalizing operating leases on audit fees could be confirmed through 
historical data analysis after a few years. This study focuses on the time prior to a regulatory 
change and thus studies afterwards could provide interesting evidence on the actual results. 
9  REFERENCES 
André, P., Broye, G., Pong, C., Schatt, A. (2015) ”Are joint audits associated with higher audit 
fees?” European Accounting Review, January 2015, Pp. 1-30. 
Ball, R., Jayaraman, S., Shivakumar, L. (2012) ”Audited fianncial reporting and voluntary 
disclosure as complements: A test of the confirmation hypothesis”. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 53 (1-2), Pp. 136-166. 
 References  
63 
Beattie, V., Edwards, K., Goodacre, A. (1998) ”The impact of constructive operating lease 
capitalisation on key accounting ratios”. Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 28 (4), Pp. 
233-254. 
Beatty, A., Liao, S., Weber, J. (2010) ”Financial reporting quality, private information, 
monitoring, and the lease-versus-buy decision”. The Accounting Review, Vol. 85 (4), Pp. 1215-
1238. 
Blankley, A:, Hurtt, D., Macgregor, J. (2012) ”Abnormal audit fees and restatements”. 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 31 (1), Pp. 79-96. 
Campa, D. (2013). ”Big 4 fee premium and audit quality: latest evidence from UK listed 
companies”. Managerial auditing Journal, Vol. 28 (8), Pp. 680-707. 
Carcello, J., Hermanson, D., Neal, T., Riley, R. (2002) ”Board characteristics and audit fees”. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 19 (3), Pp. 365-384. 
Causholli, M., Knechel, W. (2012) An examination of the credence attributes of an audit”. 
Accounting Horizons, Vol. 26 (4), Pp. 631-656. 
Chan, K., Wu, D. (2011) ”Aggregate quasi rents and auditor independence: Evidence from 
audit firm mergers in China”. Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 28 (1), Pp. 175213. 
Chaney, P., Jeter, D., Shivakumar, L. (2004) ”Self-selection of auditors and audit pricing in 
private firms”. The Accounting Review, Vol. 79 (1), Pp. 51-72. 
Cornaggia, K., Franzen, L., Simin, T. (2013) ”Bringing leased assets onto the balance sheet”. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 22, Pp. 345-360. 
Cornaggia, K., Franzen, L., Simin, T. (2012) ”Managing the balance sheet with operating 
leases”. 
http://media.business.missouri.edu/f/finance/papers/CFS_managing_August7%202012.pdf 
DeAngelo, L. (1981)”Auditor size and auditor quality”. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Vol. 3 (3), Pp. 183-199. 
 References  
64 
Dechow, P., Ge, W., Schrand, C. (2010) ”Understanding earnings quality: a review of the 
proxies, their determinants and their consequences”. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Vol. 50, Pp. 344-401. 
Deng, M., Lu, T., Simunic, D., Ye, M. (2014) ”Do joint audits improve or impair audit 
quality?”. Journal og Accounting Research, Vol. 52 (5), Pp. 1029-1060. 
Defond, M., Zhang, J. (2014) ”A review of archival auditing research”. Journal of Accounting 
Economics, Vol. 58, Issues 2-3, Pp. 275-326. 
Defond, M., Francis, J., Wong, T. (2000) ”Auditor industry specialization and market 
segmentation: Evidence from Hong Kong”. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 19 
(1), Pp.49-66. 
Deloitte. (2017) ”Leases: Key differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRSs”,  
https://www.iasplus.com/en-us/standards/ifrs-usgaap/leases#leases-of-land-and-buildings 
Dhaliwal, D., Gleason, C., Heitzman, S., Melendrez, K. (2008) ”Auditor fees and cost of debt”. 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, Vol. 23 (1), Pp. 1-22 
Dickins, D. And Higgs, J. (2005) ”Interpretation and use of auditor fee disclosures”.  Financial 
Analysts Journla, Vol. 61 (3), Pp. 96-102. 
Dogan, F. (2016) “Non-cancellable operating leases and operating leverage”. European 
Financial Management, Vol. 22 (4), Pp. 576-612. 
Dopuch, N. And Simunic, D. (1980). ”The nature of competition in the auditing profession: a 
descriptive and normative view”. Regulation and the Accounting and Economics, Vol. 48, 
(2/3), Pp. 109-209. 
Eilifsen, A., Knechel, R. and Wallage, P. (2001). Application of business risk audit model: A 
field study. Accounting Horizons, 15 (3), Pp.193-208.  
Eisfeldt, L., Rampini, A. (2009) ”Leasing, ability to repossess, and debt capability”. The 
Review of financial studies, Vol. 22 (4), Pp. 1621-1657. 
 References  
65 
FASB. (2016) Accounting Standards Update, Leases (Topic 842). 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPagecid=1176167901010&accepted 
Disclaimer=true 
FASB. (2011) Memorandum of IASB/FASB meeting 1-2 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175822158402&blobheader=a
pplication %2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs 
FASB/IASB. (2007) ”History of Lease Accounting (Agenda Paper 2)”, Memorandum of 
IASB/FASB meeting. http://archive.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Leases/Meeting-
Summaries-and-Observer-Notes/Documents/Obs2.pdf  
FASB. (1976). ”Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13”. 
Fitó, Á., Moya, S., Orgaz, N. (2013) ”Considering the effects of operating lease capitalization 
on key financial ratios”. Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting/Revista Española de 
Financiación y Contabilidad, Vol.42 (159), Pp.341-369. 
Francis, J., Michas, P., Seavey, S. (2013) ”Does audit market concentration harm the quality 
of audited earnings? Evidence from audit markets in 42 countries”. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, Vol. 30 (1), Pp. 325-355. 
Francis, J., Wang, D. (2008) ”The joint effect of investor pretection and big 4 audits on earnings 
quality around the world”. Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 25 (1), Pp. 157-191. 
Francis, J. (2004). ”What do we know about audit quality?”. The British Accounting Review, 
Vol. 36, No. 4, Pp. 345-368. 
Fülbier, R., Silva, J., Pferdehirt, M. (2008) ”Impact of lease capitalization on fianncial ratios 
of listed German companies”. Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 60 (2), Pp. 122132, 134-
136, 138-144. 
Ge, W. (2006) “Off-balance-sheet activities, earnings persistnce and stock prices: Evidence 
from operating leases”. University of Washington Business School study. 
Gonthier-Besacier, N., Schatt, A. (2007). ”Determinants of audit fees for French quoted firms”. 
Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2, Pp. 139-160. 
 References  
66 
Griffin, S. (2006) “Company law: Fundamental Principles, fourth edition”. Pearson Education 
Limited, Pp. 375. 
Hackenbrack, K., Knechel, W. (1997) ”Resource allocation decisions in audit engagements”. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 14 (3), Pp. 481-499. 
Hay, D., Knechel, W., Wong, N. (2006) ”Audit fees: A meta-analysis of the effects of supply 
and demand attributes”. Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 23 (1), Pp. 141-191. 
House of Lords. (2010) “Auditors: Market concentration and their role, call for evidence”. 
House of Lords, London. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeconaf/119/119.pdf 
IASB. (2010). ”International Accounting Standard 17 Leases”. Revised version of IAS 17 
Leases, (1997). 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/consolidated/ias17_en.pdf 
IASB. (2016) ”IFRS 16; Leases”.   http://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ifrs-
16-leases/  
IASB. (2016) ”A new Lease of Life, Investor perspective ”. 
http://archive.ifrs.org/Alerts/Publication/Documents/2016/Investor-Perspectives_A-
NewLease-of-Life.pdf 
IASB. (2017) ”Leases one year on – putting IFRS 16 into practice”. http://www.ifrs.org/-
/media/project/leases/ifrs/educational-materials/ifrs16-leases-articlejan2017.pdf 
Imhoff, E., Thomas, J. (1988) ”Economic consequences of accounting standards”. Journal od 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 10, Pp. 277-310. 
Imhoff, E., Lipe, R., Wright, D. (1991) ”Operating leases: Impact of constructive 
capitalization”. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 5 (1).  
Imhoff, E., Lipe, R., Wright, D. (1993) ”The effects of recognition versus disclosure on 
shareholder risk and executive compensation”. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,, 
Vol. 8 (4), Pp.335. 
 References  
67 
Imhoff, E., Lipe, R., Wright, D. (1997) ”Operating leases: Income effects of constructive 
capitalization”. Accounting Horizons, Vol. 11 (2), Pp. 12-32. 
Ittonen, K., Peni, E. (2012) ”Auditor's gender and audit fees”. International Journal of 
Auditing, Vol. 16 (1), Pp. 1-18. 
Ireland, C., Lennox, C. (2002) ”The large audit firm fee premium: a case of selectivity bias?” 
Journal of Accounting: Auditing and Finance, Vol. 17 (1), Pp. 73-91. 
Jennings, R., Marques, A. (2013) “Amortized cost for operating lease assets”. Accounting 
Horizons, Vol. 27 (1), Pp. 51-74. 
Khurana, I., Raman, K. (2004) ”Litigation risk and the financial reporting credibility of big 4 
versus non-big 4 audits: Evidence from Anglo-American countries”. The Accounting Review, 
Vol. 79 (2), Pp. 473-495. 
Krishnan, G., Sengupta, P. (2011) “How do auditors perceive recognized vs. disclosed lease 
and pension obligations? Evidence from fees and going-concern opinions”. International 
Journal of Auditing, Vol. 15, Pp. 127-149. 
Lawrence, G., Minutti-Meza, M., Zhang, P. (2011). ”Can Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 differences 
in audit quality proxies be attributed to client characteristics?”. The Accounting Review, Vol. 
86, No. 1, Pp. 259-286. 
Liu, C., Wang, T. (2006). ”Auditor liability and business investment”. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, Vol. 23 (4), Pp. 1051-1071. 
Loukil, L. (2016). ”The impact of IFRS on the amount of audit fees: The Case of the Large  
French listed companies”. Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting, Vol. 54 (½), Pp. 41-
68. 
Newman, D., Patterson, E., Smith, J. (2005) ”The role of auditing in investor protection”. The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 80 (1), Pp. 289-313. 
Nuryani, N., Heng, T., Juliesta, N. (2015) ”Capitalization of operating lease and its impact on 
firm's financial ratios”. Procedia – Social and Behavioural Sciences, Vol. 211, Pp. 268276. 
 References  
68 
O'keefe, T., Westort, P. (1992) “Conformance to GAAS reporting standards in municipal audits 
and the economics of auditing: The effects of audit firm size, CPA examination performance, 
and competition.” Research in Accounting Regulation, Vol. 6, p.39. 
Peel, M., Roberts, R. (2003) “Audit fee determinants and auditor premiums: Evidence from 
the micro-firm sub-market”. Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 33 (3), Pp. 207-233. 
Petroni, K., Beasley, M. (1996) “Errors in accounting estimates and their relation to audit firm 
type”. Journal of Accouting Research, Vol. 34 (1), Pp. 151 
Picconi, M. (2004) “The perils of pension: does pension accounting lead investors and analysts 
astray?” A Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University. 
Radhakrishnan, S. (1999) “Investor's recovery friction and auditor liability rules”. The 
Accounting Review, Vol. 74 (2), Pp. 225-240. 
Rampini, A., Viswanathan, S. (2013) “Collateral and capital structure”. Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 109 (2), Pp. 466-492. 
Redmayne, N., Bradbury, M., Cahan, S. (2011) “The association between audit committees 
and audit fees in the public sector”. International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 15 (3), Pp. 301315. 
Revsine, L., Collins, D., Johnson, W., Mittelstaedt, H., Soffer., L. (2017) “Financial reporting 
& analysis, 6th edition”. McGraw-Hill Education, 2017. Pp. 687-706. 
Simunic, D. (1980). “The Pricing of Audit Services: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of 
Accounting Research, Pp. 161-190. 
Simunic, D., Stein, M. (1996) “The impact of litigation risk on audit pricing: A review of the 
economics and the evidence”. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol 15, Pp. 119-134. 
Teoh, S., Wong, T. (1993) “Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient”. 
The Accounting Review, Vol. 68 (2), Pp. 346-366. 
Thornton, D., Moore, G. (1993) “Auditor choice and audit fee determinants”. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 20(3), P. 333 
 References  
69 
Vatcheva, K., Lee, M., McCormick, J., Rahbar, M. (2016) “Multicollinearity in regression 
analyses conducted in epidemiologic studies”. Published Online in Epidomiology (Sunnyvale), 
Vol. 6(2), Pp. 227.  
Vermeer, T., Raghunandan, K., Forgione, D. (2009) “Audit fees at U.S. Non-profit 
organizations”. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,  Vol. 28 (2), Pp. 289-303. 
Weber, J., Willenborg, M. (2003) “Do expert informational intermediaries add value? Evidence 
from auditors in microcap IPOs”. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 41 (4), Pp. 681-720. 
Zaman, M., Hubaid, M., Haniffa, R. (2011) “Corporate governance quality, audit fees and non-
audit sevices fees”. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 30 (1-2), Pp. 165 (33). 
